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ABSTRACT 
 
I examined how politics affects corporate policies and value in two dissertation essays. In 
my first essay, we investigate whether diversity in points of view within corporate boards, as 
captured by the diversity in political ideology of board members, can affect a firm’s 
performance. We employ personal political contributions’ data to measure political ideology 
distance among groups of inside, outside directors and the CEO. Our empirical evidence strongly 
supports the notion that outside directors’ monitoring effectiveness is more likely to be enhanced 
when their viewpoints are distinct from those of management. We find that ideologically diverse 
boards are associated with better firm performance, lower agency costs and less insiders’ 
discretionary power over the firm’s Political Action Committee (PAC) spending. Taken together, 
our results lead us to conclude that multiplicity of standpoints in corporate boardrooms is 
imperative for board effectiveness. In my second essay, we document that firms surrounded by 
high degrees of policy risk generated by local politicians’ legislative activities present 
significantly high stock returns, indicating investors’ perception of policy risk. We find that the 
diverse political strategies firms implement 1) successfully mitigate such policy risk, 2) help 
firms to acquire more lucrative procurement contracts, and 3) even get firms in trouble with legal 
issues. Additional results reveal that poor stock performance related to litigation is significantly 
recovered by political connections. Overall, our results reflect that investors view corporate 
political activities as effective hedging strategies against policy risk. Collectively, politics plays a 
critical role in determining corporate policies and/or value. 
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ESSAY 1: 
CORPORATE BOARDS’ POLITICAL IDEOLOGY DIVERSITY AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
Introduction  
Although traditional corporate governance literature places emphasis on board 
independence, the notion of superior effectiveness of independent (or outside-dominated) boards 
has been empirically challenged by several papers (e.g., Guthrie et al., 2012). The limitations of 
the role of independent directors per se have spurred finance researchers to investigate whether 
other board diversity characteristics, such as gender or ethnic diversity (e.g., see Carter et al., 
2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009) can improve board effectiveness. The rationale behind the view 
of diversity as a positive force in corporate boards lies in the premise that the existence of 
multiple, divergent viewpoints within a board will reduce the likelihood that the agenda and 
initiatives will be dominated by the CEO and his inside director allies, thereby enhancing the 
monitoring role of the board. The challenge associated with an empirical investigation of the link 
between viewpoint diversity and corporate performance is to devise a good proxy for the former. 
In this study, we propose political ideology diversity as a proxy for the range of different 
viewpoints within corporate boards and examine whether it has an impact on firm performance. 
We argue that diversity of viewpoints within corporate boards is inversely related to the 
degree of social ties between board members. Such ties develop primarily based on the 
homophily principle, i.e. on the premise that “familiarity breeds connections” (McPherson et al., 
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2001). The social networks literature (e.g., Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954) distinguishes two types 
of homophily: 1) status homophily, which is developed along socio-demographic dimensions 
such as age, sex, race, ethnicity, religion, occupation etc., and 2) value homophily, which is based 
on values, attitudes, and beliefs. In this study we focus on political values and conjecture that the 
existence of a variety of political ideologies across inside and outside board member groups 
adequately reflects the diversity of viewpoints. In the construction of political ideology diversity, 
we use information on board members’ political contributions to gauge political ideology at the 
individual level and then aggregate them at the board level.  
Based on previous literature, one can develop two opposing views on the firm value 
impact of divergent opinions within corporate boards. On one hand, social science literature 
proposes a theory called ‘team mental model’ wherein team performance is enhanced when team 
members share similar values while pursuing a common goal (Mohammed and Dumville, 2001; 
Lim and Klein, 2006). If the team mental model can be applied to corporate boards, then board 
effectiveness should improve with political values homophily leading to superior firm 
performance. On the other hand, Jensen (1993) argues that board members tend to avoid conflict 
with management thereby forming a type of corporate culture that is often conducive to inferior 
board effectiveness. In line with this argument, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) report that CEOs 
exert a significant influence on the composition of boards. If incumbent management has the 
power to appoint directors who share similar values and consequently are less willing to oppose 
management’s decisions, we should observe higher agency problems and lower valuations 
because boards will consist mostly of members that share similar values.  
Hence, based on the aforementioned contradictory predictions derived from prior 
literature, the effect of board-level political ideology diversity on firm performance is an 
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empirical issue, which we deem interesting enough to investigate in detail in this study.  
We first explore whether incumbent directors are more likely to select new directors who 
have similar political values. Our evidence shows that new directors tend to exhibit similar 
political values with incumbent directors. We compute average ideology distance between the 
inside directors (or CEO) and outside directors and relate it to firm value, measured by Tobin’s 
Q. We find that political ideology diverse boards significantly outperform a sample of matched 
firms. In univariate analysis, firms whose boards are most politically diverse present a Tobin’s Q, 
which is higher by 0.317 than that of firms with the least politically diverse board. This 
significant performance difference persists in various regression models that control for other 
important corporate governance variables.  
In addition to finding robust evidence of superior performance associated with diverse 
board political ideology, we also examine possible explanations. First, we test whether agency 
costs are associated with political ideology distance. If outside directors maintain different views 
from management, it may help outside directors provide more objective evaluations of 
managerial decisions and plans. Therefore, we expect a negative relation between diversity of 
viewpoints in a boardroom and agency costs.  Our empirical results support this hypothesis. We 
also explore how incumbent inside and outside directors affect an important dimension of firms’ 
corporate political strategy, i.e. Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions. Bebchuk and 
Jackson (2010) claim that “corporate political speech” decisions are not always aligned with 
shareholders’ wealth and should be independent of ordinary business decisions. For example, a 
CEO may use corporate PAC contributions to establish the social network groundwork that could 
potentially provide personal gains in the future. We find that corporate political ideology is 
significantly aligned with that of insiders. Further analysis suggests that ideologically diverse 
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boards significantly reduce insiders’ discretionary power over PACs’ spending. Taken together, 
the results are consistent with the notion that diversity of viewpoints in corporate boards 
improves firm performance by lowering agency costs and reducing insiders’ discretionary power 
over expending firm resources. 
We contribute to the corporate governance literature by providing evidence that political 
ideology diversity is a board attribute that is positively related to firm value. Recent literature has 
shifted focus from the mere existence of independent directors, and now investigates when 
independent directors provide value to the firm, as is the case, for example, when there are busy 
directors (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), when there are more socially independent directors 
(Hwang and Kim, 2009), local directors (Alam et al., 2012), female directors (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009), and in the absence of co-opted boards (Coles et al., 2010). We extend this line of 
research by employing a direct measure of directors’ personal value and documenting how 
differences in value among decision makers affect firm performance.  
Our paper is probably most closely related to the paper by Hwang and Kim (2009). They 
rely on socio-demographic characteristics of homophily, such as alumni, military service, 
regional origin, academic discipline, and industry experience, to measure the likelihood for the 
existence of social ties between the CEO and independent directors. Our investigation is based 
on political ideology (i.e., a characteristic of values-based homophily) as a proxy for the 
existence of a multitude of opinions within the board and therefore superior monitoring.   
This paper is also related to the notion that personal values can affect corporate behavior 
and complements a growing body of research that provides evidence in line with the view that 
personal preferences, as opposed to purely rational profit maximization, affect financial behavior. 
In particular, some prior papers have used individual political values as proxy for personal traits. 
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For instance, a personal political affiliation has been shown to affect portfolio composition 
(Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012), stock market participation (Kaustia and Torstila, 2011) and 
Bonaparte et al., 2010), analysts’ forecasting behavior (Jiang et al., 2011), corporate social 
responsibility (Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2011), and corporate policy decisions (Hutton et al., 
2011). We complement these studies by providing evidence that individual directors’ views, 
measured by political ideology, also matter for firm performance and policy.  
Our paper also provides empirical evidence that CEO and director political ideologies 
matter for corporate political speech. While Cooper et al. (2010) demonstrate that PAC 
contributing firms exhibit better stock market performance, Aggarwal et al. (2012) provide 
results that are in sharp contrast to Cooper et al.’s findings. Aggarwal et al. report that PAC 
contributing firms exhibit similar characteristics with firms exposed to high levels of agency 
problems (e.g., large firms with high levels of free cash flow) and, in fact, contributing firms 
significantly underperform relative to non-contributing firms. Bebchuk and Jackson (2013) 
further note that if the decision for PAC spending is solely determined by insiders’ political 
affiliation (CEO or other executives), those contributions may be used primarily for insiders’ 
own benefits (e.g., to prepare the ground for taking a political position in the future). Thus, to a 
certain extent, there exists a potential risk that political contributions may hurt shareholders’ 
wealth. Our evidence suggests that political ideology diversity in corporate boards can 
effectively reduce the possibility that “corporate political speech” is solely driven by insiders’ 
political voices.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides literature reviews and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents empirical results. We 
conclude in Section 5. 
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Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
The corporate governance literature has examined various dimensions of board 
independence in order to answer when board effectiveness is improved. In particular, a growing 
body of literature emphasizes the effect of diversified boards on firm value and policies. For 
instance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that boards with female directors tend to be associated 
with better monitoring, probably due to the fact that they are more likely to attend board 
meetings, and partly because they participate to a greater extent in nominating committees. 
Anderson et al. (2011) conclude that firms with diverse boards, where diversity is measured by 
six demographic and professional director characteristics, exhibit better performance than firms 
with non-diverse boards. Byoun et al. (2012) find that diverse boards are more likely to pay 
dividends thereby avoiding free cash flow problems. 
Furthermore, recent studies have addressed how social relationships that may exist 
between a CEO and outside directors affect firm performance. Hwang and Kim (2009) provide 
evidence that socially independent boards are more effective monitors than socially connected 
boards. In a similar vein and in an M&A context, Fracassi and Tate (2012) find that strong CEO-
director ties decrease firm value. In contrast with Hwang and Kim (2010) and Fracassi and Tate 
(2012), Coles et al. (2010) find co-opted boards, defined as such based on the percent of 
directors elected after the CEO was hired, are positively associated with firm performance. Coles 
et al. (2010) assume that directors elected after the CEO is hired are more likely to have values 
that are consistent with those of the CEO.  
We revisit the issue of whether and how divergent points of view between management 
and outside directors can have an impact on board effectiveness. We employ a proxy for diversity 
of viewpoints within the board based on the distance of political values among directors and test 
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whether this ideology-based measure can capture the impact of opinion diversity on firm value. 
First, we explore whether incumbent directors prefer to appoint incoming colleagues that share 
similar values. We, then, test whether difference of political values among directors affects firm 
value. 
H1. All other things equal, incumbent directors prefer to hire new directors with similar political 
ideologies (γ1>0; γ3>0). 
 
 New director’s political ideology = γ0 + γ1Incumbent inside director’s political ideology 
+ γ2 Standard deviation (Incumbent inside director’s political ideology) + γ3 Incumbent 
outside director’s political ideology + γ4 Standard deviation (Incumbent outside 
director’s political ideology) + ∑γs controls 
 
H2. All other things equal, politically divergent boards are associated with better performance 
(γ1 >0). 
 
 Firm performance = γ0 + γ1Distance in political ideologies + ∑γs controls 
 
In this paper we measure four types of distances in political ideologies given a board; the 
distance among all directors (Dist_all_dir), the distance between the inside and outside directors 
(Dist_ins_out), the distance between the CEO and outside directors (Dist_CEO_out) and the 
distance between the CEO and inside directors (Dist_CEO_ins). 
 We also implement two additional tests to investigate the agency costs and corporate 
political strategy implications of political ideology diversity in the boardroom. First, the 
investigation into agency costs is inspired by the findings of Puglisi and Snyder (2008), who 
show that Democratic leaning newspapers tend to uncover Republican-involved political 
scandals and vice versa. Their evidence implies that politically oppositely leaning individuals 
and institutions evaluates the other party’s work with a more objective view and exerts greater 
effort in restraining misbehavior. Applying the Puglisi and Snyder (2008) insight in the context 
of corporate governance, we can infer that directors whose political ideologies differ from those 
8 
 
of the top management will be more inclined to express their opposition to what they perceive as 
suboptimal managerial decisions thereby strengthening the boards monitoring function. 
Therefore, we predict that politically divergent boards are associated with less agency costs of 
free cash flow.1 
 Second, we explore how ideological diversity affects a firm’s corporate political strategy 
in terms of its PAC contributions. Cooper et al. (2010) demonstrate that political contributions 
help firms build a relationship with politicians and ultimately become a source of positive 
abnormal returns. However, it is possible that corporate PAC contributions might not be 
structured in a way that is aligned with shareholders’ interests, but instead they may become a 
vehicle for the pursuit of corporate insiders’ personal goals (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2010). In fact, 
Aggarwal et al. (2012) document that firms making donations to political candidates for federal 
offices in the United States from 1991 to 2004 have operating characteristics consistent with the 
existence of a free cash flow problem and donations that are negatively correlated with returns. 
Given the potential for misuse of political contributions, we test whether politically divergent 
boards mitigate the potential for insiders’ opportunistic behavior in corporate PAC contributions 
decisions. 
H3: All other things equal, politically divergent boards exhibit lower agency costs than 
politically united boards (γ1 <0). 
 
 Agency costs = γ0 + γ1Distance in political ideologies + ∑γs controls 
 
H4: All other things equal, politically divergent boards reduce the possibility that corporate PAC 
contributions are solely driven by insiders’ political affiliation (γ1 >0). 
 
 Abs(PAC’s political ideology – Insider’s political ideology) = γ0 + γ1Distance in political 
ideologies + ∑γs controls 
 
                                                 
1Agency costs of free cash flow are measured following Doukas et al. (2000) and Antia et al. (2010) as the product 
of free cash flows and a poor growth opportunities indicator variable that takes the value of one (zero) if the firm’s 
Tobin’s Q is less (equal to or greater) than one.
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where insiders’ polid is the political ideology of corporate insiders as reflected in their personal 
PAC contribution portfolio and PACID is the corresponding firm political ideology reflected in 
the corporate PAC contribution portfolio. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics  
We first gather directors’ personal information (i.e., name, age, position on the board, 
ownership, number of other directorships held and past employment) as well as firm-level 
information (e.g, G-index) from RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC). As mentioned by Masulis et al. 
(2012), some important director characteristics are missing prior to 1998. Therefore, our sample 
period starts in1999 and ranges to 2005. We only retain firms that are included in the S&P 1500 
index and do not have missing market and accounting information. Following  past studies in 
corporate governance (Knyazeva et al., 2009; Linck et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2011, among 
others), we also exclude the highly regulated industries such as financial firms (SIC: 6000- 6999) 
and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). Finally, due to the substantial time investment required to hand 
collect political information, we follow the procedure used in many other studies that used hand-
collected data (e.g., Alam et al., 2012) and we randomly select 500 firms. The final sample 
consists of 500 unique firms with 5,576 directors (2,611 firm-year and 23,391 director-year 
observations). 
We then proceed to identify individuals’ political contributions from the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) website.2 The political contributions dataset includes a contributor’s name, 
current address, employment affiliation, contribution year, and the supported candidate’s name 
and party, among other things. To match directors’ information and contribution data, a 
contributor’s name and employment affiliation are used as a primary key. In the contributions 
dataset inside directors, such as CEOs or other executives, typically report their current 
                                                 
2 The data can be found at http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/norindsea.shtml. 
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employment affiliation and position. However, in contrast to inside directors, outside directors 
often do not report their primary employment affiliation but rather affiliations associated with 
other positions they may hold. This inherent limitation makes it impossible to obtain the best 
matching results from an automated algorithm. We therefore hand collect individual 
contributions searching by the first name and last name in the FEC website. We focus on 
contributions that go to either Republican or Democratic candidates in order to construct a 
measure of political ideology at the individual level from 1997 to 2006. If a director’s 
information in the RiskMetrics database is not complete enough to determine whether he/she is 
the same person listed in FEC’s contribution database, we conduct additional searches using 
Wikipedia, Zoominfo, Forbes.com, NNDB.com, BusinessWeek.com and the SEC fillings to 
identify the director’s background. Our procedure resulted in the correct identification of over 
98% of all directors’ contributions.3 
Following Hutton et al. (2011), we measure an individual’s political ideology as: 
Contributions to Republican Party - Contributions to Democratic Party
Polid =
Total Contributions  
(1) 
This measure is continuous and bounded by -1 (extreme Democrat) and 1 (extreme 
Republican). If one never makes a contribution during the sample period, we assume that he or 
she is politically indifferent (i.e., we set Polid =0). To avoid the distortion of the political 
ideology measures by local and temporary considerations (e.g., a Republican CEO can make 
contributions to Democratic candidate in a particular election if the Democratic candidate is 
more likely to win the election in the district where the firm’s headquarter is located), we 
accumulate political contributions over all years up to a certain point and rebalance it every two 
                                                 
3 The inclusion or exclusion of missing directors does not affect our result. Throughout our tests, we assign 
directors’ political ID value equal to 0 if we cannot exactly identify the director’s political contributions. 
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years (per election cycle).  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our sample at the individual and firm levels. As 
shown in Panel A, approximately 60% of directors in our sample make political contributions 
during our sample period.4 Over the 8 year span of our sample period, the average director 
contribution is about $12,000. The amount of contributions that support Republican candidates is 
almost double of what Democratic candidates receive. Therefore, on average, 63% of directors’ 
political ideology leans more toward the Republican Party, and just above 35% of directors’ 
ideology leans toward the Democratic Party. With each director’s political ideology value at 
hand, we develop several variables that measure political ideology distance between the CEO 
and insider and outsider director groups. 
1,
1
_ _
[( 1) ( 2) 1]
A B Director Director
t i,x,t i,y,tx x y
Dist all dir Polid Polid
A B A B

 
 
        
 , (2) 
, 1 1
1
_ _
A B Insider Outsider
i t i,b,t i,a,ta b
Dist ins out Polid Polid
A B  
 

  , (3) 
, , , ,1
1
_ _
A CEO Outsider
i t i t i a ta
Dist CEO out Polid Polid
A 
  , (4) 
, , , ,1
1
_ _
B CEO Insider
i t i t i b tb
Dist CEO ins Polid Polid
B 
  , (5) 
where Director
i,x,tPolid  is the political ideology of director x in firm i. 
Insider
i,b,tPolid  is the political ideology 
of inside director b in firm i. Outside
i,a,tPolid  is the political ideology of outside director a in firm i. 
CEO
i,tPolid  is the political ideology of CEO in firm i. A and B are the numbers of outside directors 
and inside directors, respectively.5 
                                                 
4 The participation rate is not much different when we calculate it on an election-cycle basis. On average, 
approximately 60% of directors make political contributions per election cycle as well. In Giuli and Kostovetsky 
(2011)’s work, about 70% of directors make at least one contribution from 2003 to 2009. 
 
5 To illustrate differences among the four distance measures, we suggest a simple case where a firm has 4 inside 
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Panel B of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these variables. While mean values 
of Dist_ins_out and Dist_CEO_out hover around 0.66, the mean of Dist_CEO_ins6 is 0.33, 
which indicates that ideological proximity is much more pronounced between CEO and other 
insiders than between insiders and outsiders. Although, as mentioned before, the average director 
exhibits Republican-leaning political values, insiders’ ideologies lean more toward that of the 
Republican Party while outsiders’ lean more toward that of the Democrats. 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Political characteristics at an individual level 
Contributor 5,576 0.595  1.000  0.491  0.000  1.000  
Contributions to Democratic Party 3,315 4373 1,000 13081 0 449600 
Contributions to Republican Party 3,315 7485 2250 15601 0 197960 
Total Contributions 3,315 11857 5000 20490 200 451979 
Polid 3,315 0.245  0.632  0.826  -1.000  1.000  
Democratic leaning directors 3,315 0.354  0.000  0.478  0.000  1.000  
Republican leaning directors 3,315 0.631  1.000  0.483  0.000  1.000  
Panel B: Political characteristics at a firm level 
Dist_all_dir 2,611 0.662 0.658 0.241 0.000 1.313 
Dist_ins_out 2,611 0.666 0.667 0.264 0.000 1.867 
Dist_CEO_out 2,611 0.659 0.643 0.330 0.000 2.000 
Dist_CEO_ins 2,611 0.330 0.333 0.311 0.000 1.422 
CEOPolid  2,611 0.272  0.018  0.678  -1.000  1.000  
Average ( InsiderPolid ) 2,611 0.232  0.239  0.499  -1.000  1.000  
Standard deviation ( InsiderPolid ) 2,611 0.407  0.481  0.350  0.000  1.414  
Average ( OutsiderPolid ) 2,611 0.149  0.163  0.342  -1.000  1.000  
Standard deviation ( OutsiderPolid ) 2,611 0.595  0.577  0.251  0.000  1.414  
Directors’ total contributions 2,611 14963 0 38682 0 650329 
Corporate PAC contributions  2,611 0.167  0.000  0.373  0.000  1.000  
                                                                                                                                                             
directors (a, b, c, and d) and 5 outside directors (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) on its board. For Dist_CEO_ins, we have 4 
possible pairs: (CEO-a), …, (CEO-d), while there are 5 possible pairs for Dist_CEO_out: (CEO-1), …, (CEO-5). In 
the construction of Dist_ins_out, there are 20 pairs each involving an inside and an outside director: (a-1), (a-2), …, 
(d-5). Finally, Dist_all_dir considers all combinations between any two directors regardless of whether they are 
insiders or outsiders. We get 36 (= (9x8)/2) different pairs. 
 
6 We also examine the effects of the distance in political ideology between the CEO and insider groups. Throughout 
the tests, the effects are at most marginally significant or insignificant. The results are omitted from the main tables. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Corporate PAC contributions to Democratic Party 438 26044  13000  38605  0  294700  
Corporate PAC contributions to Republican Party 438 66632  29600  92022  500  586500  
Corporate total PAC contributions 438 92676  44271  122674  10000  830800  
PACPolid  438 0.401  0.409  0.331  -0.905  1.000  
Dist_PAC_ins 438 0.387  0.318  0.291  0.000  1.494  
Voter turnout 2,611 0.379  0.374  0.068  0.229  0.608  
Voter turnout for Republican Party 2,611 0.433  0.445  0.139  0.090  0.860  
Voter turnout for Democratic Party 2,611 0.516  0.505  0.129  0.116  0.898  
Vote ratio 2,611 0.992  0.881  0.709  0.105  7.390  
Panel C: Controlling variables 
Assets 
†
 2,611 4585.81 976.375 12474.64 87.91 96484 
Q 
†
 2,611 2.253 1.654 1.660 0.769 9.977 
ROA 
†
 2,601 0.152 0.147 0.096 -0.149 0.470 
Leverage
†
 2,597 0.204 0.198 0.170 0.000 0.667 
FCF 
†
 2,590 0.092 0.093 0.079 -0.235 0.306 
 Sales growth 
†
 2,611 0.122 0.084 0.245 -0.477 1.125 
CEO duality 2,611 0.613 1.000 0.487 0.000 1.000 
Board size 2,611 8.922  9.000  2.386  1.000  21.000  
Independent directors 2,611 0.649  0.667  0.171  0.000  1.000  
Proportion of busy directors 2,611 0.119  0.000  0.165  0.000  1.000  
Contributing directors (annual) 2,611 0.149 0.000 0.233 0.000 1.000 
Contributing directors (cumulative) 2,611 0.619  0.636  0.222  0.000  1.000  
GIM index 2,611 9.135  9.000  2.563  3.000  17.000  
Average (insider’s age) 2,608 56.62 57.00 5.78 36.00 75.00 
Standard deviation (insider’s age) 2,608 6.36 6.14 4.87 0.00 28.44 
Average (outsider’s age) 2,608 59.98 60.00 4.55 39.00 79.50 
Standard deviation (outsider’s age) 2,608 7.25 7.00 3.17 0.00 23.33 
Proportion of in-state directors 2,611 0.411 0.333 0.357 0.000 1.000  
Proportion of co-opted directors 2,491 0.438 0.400 0.362 0.000 1.000 
This table provides descriptive statistics of our sample (1999-2005). The detailed definitions of variables are 
reported in Appendix 1. Panel A summarizes information of political contributions of 5,576 unique directors. Panel 
B contains information of political contributions of sample firms. Panel C exhibits summary statistics of control 
variables. The detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix 1. † Accounting variables that are winsorized at the 
top1% and the bottom 99%. 
 
 In Panel B we also report descriptive statistics for firm-level PAC contributions.7 On 
average, 17% of our sample firms engage in PACs. On average, firm contributions over an 
                                                 
7 Firm-level PAC information can be found at http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml (primary) and 
http://www.campaignmoney.com/ (supplement).  
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election cycle amount to $92,676. More than two thirds of corporate PACs support Republican 
candidates. Directors’ total contributions represent an aggregate amount of individual directors’ 
PAC contributions at a given firm-year. The average amount is approximately $15,000. We also 
develop two variables designed to measure the external political environment. The first measure, 
Vote ratio, is calculated as the ratio of the votes cast in favor of the Republican Party over the 
votes cast in favor of the Democratic Party in the latest Presidential election in the county where 
a firm’s headquarter is located. The second variable is the Voter turnout expressed as the 
percentage of total votes over total population in the latest Presidential election in the county 
where a firm’s headquarter is located. 
In Panel C we include descriptive statistics for other variables, such as size, performance, 
leverage, board characteristics etc, that are used as control variables in the subsequent 
multivariate tests. Note in a given year about 15% of all firms have  at least one director who 
contributes to PACs (contributing directors (annual)), while 62% of firms have at least one 
director making PAC contributions at some point during the sample period (contributing 
directors (cumulative)). The detailed definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix 1.  
Empirical Results  
Do incumbent directors prefer to appoint new directors who share similar political ideologies?  
The homophily principle, which simply states that familiarity breeds connection, is a 
well-established fact in the social networks’ literature. For example, geographic proximity is a 
powerful driver of social ties.8 In addition, many social and psychological studies indicate that 
people tend to choose co-workers who share similar backgrounds, demographic characteristics as 
                                                 
8 Propinquity has been shown to be instrumental in close relationships, such as friendship and marriage (Bossard, 
1932), in the frequency of communications within firms (Allen, 1984), in the forming of interlocked corporate 
boards (Kono, Palmer, Friedland, and Zafonte, 1998), in dealings among floor traders (Baker, 1984), and in 
investment patterns of venture capital firms (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). 
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well as values (Marsden, 1988; McPherson et al., 2001). This is because, other things equal, 
sharing common values among team members more likely improves team coordination and 
makes for a better workplace environment (Mohammed and Dumville, 2001; Lim and Klein, 
2006). Assuming that political values to some extent also reflect personal values, we can then 
expect that newly elected directors’ political ideologies will be more likely to resemble those of 
existing directors. We test this hypothesis using Tobit regressions instead of OLS ones because 
the dependent variable, new director’s political ideology (Polid), is bounded by -1 and 1. Table 2 
reports the estimated coefficients of the Tobit regressions and the corresponding p-values in 
parentheses. In the first column the sample includes all new directors, regardless of whether they 
are insiders or outsiders, whereas in columns (2) and (3) we perform the test using the 
subsamples of new inside directors and new outside directors, respectively.9 The independent 
variables include the average political ideology of inside and outside directors as well as the 
standard deviations of political ideology values within the inside and outside director groups. 
Although directors are supposed to be elected by shareholders, several papers note that 
management is somehow involved in selecting new directors (e.g., Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999). Therefore, by splitting directors into inside and outside groups, we want to see whether a 
particular group’s political ideology more strongly resembles that of the new director. Our 
regression models also account for the local political environment. This consideration is made in 
the spirit of Hilary and Hui (2009) who find that CEOs’ religious affiliations tend to be similar to 
that of the county where their firm is located. Perhaps, the same is true for political ideologies as 
well. Thus, we include the Vote ratio variable, which is measured by the ratio of voter turnout for 
                                                 
9 We identify new directors in the IRRC dataset as follows; if the first year that a particular person begins to serve as 
a director for a firm equals the calendar year of the annual meeting date, we assume this is a new director. 
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Republican Party to voter turnout for Democratic Party. Our models also include firm size, board 
size, performance, average age of existing directors, industry and year fixed effects. 
Table 2 Alignment of Directors’ Political Ideology 
  Dependent variable: New directors’ Polidt+1 
 
All new directors Only new insiders Only new outsiders 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Average ( InsiderPolid )t 0.082 0.114 0.066 
 
(0.107) (0.272) (0.266) 
Standard deviation ( InsiderPolid )t -0.030 -0.145 0.000 
 
(0.670) (0.284) (0.998) 
Average ( OutsiderPolid )t 0.146 0.132 0.172 
 
(0.041)** (0.356) (0.041)** 
Standard deviation ( OutsiderPolid )t -0.099 0.075 -0.154 
 
(0.293) (0.663) (0.169) 
Vote ratiot 0.209 0.309 0.145 
 
(0.259) (0.380) (0.504) 
Log (Director’s age)t 0.650 0.825 0.617 
 
(0.076)* (0.208) (0.160) 
Log (Asset)t 0.017 0.056 0.002 
 
(0.302) (0.072)* (0.903) 
Log (Board size)t -0.089 -0.001 -0.144 
 
(0.421) (0.994) (0.289) 
Q t 0.001 0.011 -0.006 
 
(0.948) (0.744) (0.802) 
Intercept -2.459 -3.749 -2.047 
 
(0.094)* (0.152) (0.246) 
    
Year fixed Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 867 208 659 
Adj. R
2
 1.70% 5.10% 1.70% 
This table exhibits the results of Tobit regressions that examine a relation between new directors’ political ideology 
and existing directors’ political ideology. New directors are identified if the service beginning year is equal to the 
calendar year of the annual board meeting date. Model (1) includes all new directors hired regardless of types of 
directors. Model (2) limits for new inside (employee or grey) directors. Model (3) is only for new outside (or 
independent) directors. The detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix 1. Numbers in parentheses are p-values 
that are adjusted by heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. ** and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Overall, our evidence suggests that new directors’ political ideologies are significantly 
aligned with that of existing directors, and particularly with that of outside directors. The 
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coefficient of outside directors’ political ideology is 0.146, which is almost twice as large as that 
of the insiders’. In models (2) and (3), we separately run regressions for subsamples formed by 
the type of new director: new inside and outside directors, respectively. Consistent with the result 
in model (1), the coefficients of the political ideology variables are positive but mostly 
insignificant. While the local political environment variable (Vote ratio) is not statistically 
significant, the mean-age of the board is positively and significantly associated with new 
directors’ political ideology. This indicates that boards consisting of older members prefer 
Republican leaning new directors. Overall, although the results are consistent with the notion 
that boards tend to consist of people with similar political values, the evidence is not strong 
enough to suggest that existing directors tend to select directors who have similar political values 
or that new directors prefer to work for a firm where people share their political values. 
Do political ideology diverse boards enhance firm value? 
 The alignment of ideologies among decision makers is not always beneficial for firms. In 
particular, there is abundant evidence in the corporate governance literature that collaboration 
between management and outside directors, who are supposed to monitor management on behalf 
of other shareholders, often increases agency costs and thereby proves to be detrimental to firm 
value. In the next five tables, we report results from several tests aimed at providing further 
insight into the question of whether corporate boards’ political ideology diversity can affect firm 
performance. In Table 3, we report results of univariate tests. We divide our sample firms into 
quintile groups based on the three previously mentioned measures of political ideology distance 
between director groups and between the CEO and director groups: Dist_all_dir, Dist_ins_out, 
and Dist_CEO_out.  Subsample 5 (H) includes firms with the most politically diverse boards and 
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subsample 1 (L) includes firms with the least diverse boards. For each subsample we report the 
mean values of three important variables: 
1) Firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, which is defined here as the ratio of market 
value of total assets to book value of total assets. 
2) Agency costs; following Doukas et al. (2000) and Antial et al. (2010) we define agency 
costs as the product of free cash flows (FCF) and a poor growth opportunities indicator 
(Poor growth) that takes the value of one if the firm’s Tobin’s Q is less than one, and zero 
otherwise 
FCF
Agency Costs = × Poor growth×100
Total assets
 (6) 
3) Insiders’ discretionary power, measured by ideology distance between the insiders’ 
political ideology and the firm’s political ideology as reflected in corporate PAC 
contributions. Low values of this distance measure reflect greater discretionary power of 
the insiders. 
Table 3 Univariate Tests 
    5 (H) 4 3 2 1 (L) (H-L) P value 
(1) Dist_all_dir Q 2.199 2.061 1.983 2.020 1.882 0.317 (<0.001) 
 
Agency costs 0.176 0.237 0.263 0.276 0.655 -0.479 (0.001) 
 
Dist_PAC_ins 0.473 0.386 0.418 0.458 0.350 0.123 (<0.001) 
         
(2) Dist_ins_out Q 2.187 2.116 1.906 2.013 1.908 0.278 (0.001) 
 Agency costs 0.108 0.264 0.237 0.433 0.560 -0.452 (0.002) 
 Dist_PAC_ins 0.525 0.451 0.403 0.413 0.290 0.235 (<0.001 
         
(3) Dist_CEO_out Q 2.040 2.106 1.998 2.099 1.894 0.146 (0.052) 
 Agency costs 0.199 0.294 0.349 0.245 0.514 -0.316 (0.044) 
  Dist_PAC_ins 0.827 0.681 0.528 0.400 0.343 0.483 (<0.001) 
This table presents univariate results regarding a relation between political distance measures among directors and 
firm value. Political distance measures among directors are constructed as follows. 
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where Director
i,x,tPolid  is the political ideology of director x in firm i. 
Insider
i,b,tPolid  is the political ideology of inside director 
b in firm i. Outside
i,a,tPolid  is the political ideology of outside director a in firm i. 
CEO
i,tPolid  is the political ideology of 
CEO in firm i. A and B are the numbers of outside directors and inside directors, respectively. Group 5 represents the 
most politically diversified boards. Group 1 implies the least. Firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q. Agency costs 
are the product of FCF and Poor growth, where FCF is free cash flow normalized by assets, and Poor growth is a 
dummy that equals one if Tobin’s Q is less than one, and zero otherwise. Dist_PAC_ins is political ideology distance 
between firm and insiders, measured by average value of political ideology distance between PAC
i,tPolid  and a member 
of the inside director group, where PAC
i,tPolid  is the firm’s political ideology reflected in the corporate PAC 
contribution portfolio. The detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix 1. 
 
Regardless of type of political ideology distance measure used, the politically diverse 
boards’ subsamples display, on average, higher Tobin’s Q than the subsample of firms with 
boards consisting of directors with similar political ideologies. Based on the distance between 
inside and outside directors’ political ideologies, Tobin’s Q for the most diverse board is larger 
than that of the least diverse boards by 0.317, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
addition, the univariate test results in Table 3 indicate that politically diverse boards mitigate 
agency costs and insiders’ discretionary power over PAC spending more than boards with 
homogenous political ideologies.  
 Next, we test the relation between board ideological diversity and firm performance in a 
multivariate regression framework. First, we conduct the pooled OLS regressions. However, the 
results of simple OLS regressions could be biased due to potential endogeneity. Specifically, 
political ideology and firm performance could have common (unobservable) determinants. 
Therefore, we also employ two-stage least squares (or 2SLS) regressions with an instrument 
variable. Anderson et al. (2011) argue that local demographic diversity is reflected in board 
composition of local firms. Davis and Henderson (2008) indicate that firms consider local 
diversity when choosing a location for their headquarters. In a similar vein, we take the view that 
local political environment could be related to the political diversity of local firms’ boards. 
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Koetzle (1998) based on U.S. House of representatives election outcomes documents that 
Democratic candidates are more favored in areas with higher demographic diversity (e.g., a 
higher proportion of minorities in a given congressional district) from 1898 to 1992. Koetzle’s 
work leads us to develop two instrument variables from local political characteristics: Vote ratio 
and Voter turnout. The first instrument proxies for the color and the second for the strength of 
local political participation. Vote ratio captures a county-level partisanship where a firm’s 
headquarter is located in. The rationale for the choice of this instrument is that political ideology 
diversity in the boardroom may to a great extent depend on local political preferences. For 
example, we predict that if a firm’s headquarter is located in strongly liberal (or Democratic 
leaning) state the composition of board political ideologies will tend to be more diverse as a 
result of the fact that individuals with liberal ideologies tend to be more tolerant and inclusive. 
On the other hand, in states that are strongly conservative (Republican leaning) we expect to see 
less ideological diversity in local corporate boards due to the fact that individuals with 
conservative ideologies tend to be less likely to accept others that do not share their values. 
Moreover, while this county-level measure of partisanship is expected to be important in 
explaining the degree of diversity of directors’ political ideologies, it is not necessarily expected 
to have a direct impact on market valuation and other firm performance related measures. Our 
second instrument is Voter turnout that proxies for political participation as costly action by a 
rational voter who wants to exhibit own political preference.10 We measure an individual’s 
political ideology using his/her PAC donations that incur both monetary and non-monetary costs. 
Hence, we expect that engaging in voting and PAC donations are highly correlated. Bartle (1997) 
finds that individuals with more political knowledge are more likely to participate in voting. 
                                                 
10 A rational voter only participates in voting if expected benefits exceed voting costs (Down, 1957; Dhillon and 
Peralta, 2002; Geys, 2006). 
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Therefore, directors residing in areas with higher voter turnout are more likely to engage in 
PACs. Based on the discussion above, the structure of our 2SLS regressions is as follows: 
1st stage: Political ideology distance = γ0 + γ1 Vote ratio + γ2 Voter turnout + ∑γ3-11 controls 
2nd stage: Tobin’s Q = γ0 + γ1 predicted value of political distance measures + ∑γ2-12 controls 
 
Table 4 Determinants of Politically Divergent Boards 
  Dependent variable: 
 
Log (1+Dist_all_dirt) Log (1+Dist_ins_outt) Log (1+Dist_CEO_outt) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Reverse vote ratiot 0.005 0.007 0.013 
 
(0.019)** (0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Voter turnoutt 0.247 0.351 0.400 
 
(<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Log (Assets)t 0.019 0.023 0.010 
 
(<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (0.004)*** 
Leveraget -0.007 -0.009 -0.001 
 
(0.691) (0.641) (0.979) 
ROAt -0.033 -0.018 0.020 
 
(0.433) (0.690) (0.724) 
Free casht 0.071 0.061 -0.044 
 
(0.213) (0.305) (0.561) 
Sales growtht -0.009 0.002 -0.016 
 
(0.577) (0.917) (0.407) 
CEO dualityt 0.014 0.011 0.030 
 
(0.023)** (0.091)* (0.001)*** 
Log (Board size)t 0.028 0.042 0.077 
 
(0.066)* (0.012)** (<0.001)*** 
Proportion of independent directorst 0.085 0.047 0.086 
 
(<0.001)*** (0.034)** (0.002)*** 
Proportion of busy directorst 0.082 0.047 0.018 
 
(<0.001)*** (0.034)** (0.457) 
Log (1+Directors’ total contributions)t 0.132 0.122 0.061 
 
(<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (0.032)** 
G-indext 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.828) (0.415) (0.432) 
Intercept 0.052 0.010 0.010 
 
(0.158) (0.795) (0.834) 
Industry / year fixed Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,547 2,547 2,547 
Adj. R2 14.58% 12.70% 8.25% 
This table presents the results of the first-stage models in 2SLS regressing political distance measure on an 
instrument variable as well as other control variables. The dependent variables are as follows. 
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where Director
i,x,tPolid  is the political ideology of director x in firm i. 
Insider
i,b,tPolid  is the political ideology of inside director b 
in firm i. Outside
i,a,tPolid  is the political ideology of outside director a in firm i. 
CEO
i,tPolid  is the political ideology of CEO in 
firm i. A and B are the numbers of outside directors and inside directors, respectively. Vote Ratio is the ratio of the 
votes cast in favor of the Republican Party over the votes cast in favor of the Democratic Party in the latest 
Presidential election in the county where the firm’s headquarter is located. Voter turnout is the ratio of total voters 
over total population in the latest Presidential election in the county where a firm’s headquarter is located. The 
detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix 1. Numbers in parentheses are p-values that are adjusted by 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Industry and year dummies are included. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
 The results of the OLS and the 2SLS estimations are reported in Tables 4 and 5. First, 
Table 4 presents results of the first stage regressions where the dependent variables are the three 
different measures of political ideology distance, i.e. that among the inside and outside groups of 
directors and those among the CEO and each of the two director groups. Since all dependent 
variables are bounded by -1 and 1, we log-transform these variables after adding 1. To allow for 
easier interpretation of its coefficient, we use the reverse value of Vote ratio (i.e., a higher reverse 
value for Democratic leaning county). As predicted, we find all distance measures are positively 
and significantly related to the Reverse vote ratio and Voter turnout. The coefficient ranges from 
0.005 to 0.013 for Reverse vote ratio, while it ranges from 0.247 to 0.400 for Voter turnout, 
indicating that firms in Democratic leaning areas and politically active areas tend to have more 
politically diverse boards. In addition, the coefficient of Log(Assets) is positive and significant, 
indicating that larger firms have more diverse boards. Similarly, the results indicate that boards 
of firms with larger board sizes, more independent directors, more busy directors and directors 
who more engage in more PAC donations exhibit greater diversity of political ideology. 
In Table 5, we report the results of the pooled OLS as well as the second stage of the two-
stage least squares (2 SLS) regressions, where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q and the main 
independent variables are raw political distance measures (models (1) to (3)) and the predicted 
value of each political distance measure from the first-stage regression (models (4) to (6)), 
respectively. Overall, our results strongly indicate that boards’ political ideology diversity is 
associated with higher market valuation. All three political ideology distance measures have 
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positive and significant coefficients. In the OLS results, the coefficients range from 0.194 to 
0.355. The levels of statistical significances are less than 1%. 
 
Table 5 Politically Divergent Boards and Firm Performance 
 Dependent variable: Qt+1 
 Pooled OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dist_all_dirt 0.355      
 
(<0.001)*** 
  
   
Dist_ins_outt 
 
0.283 
 
   
  
(0.001)*** 
 
   
Dist_CEO_outt   
0.194    
   
(0.002)***    
Log (1+Dist_all_dirt)    5.902   
    (<0.001)***   
Log (1+Dist_ins_outt)     4.134  
     (<0.001)***  
Log (1+Dist_CEO_outt)      3.340 
      (<0.001)*** 
Log (Assets)t 0.043 0.042 0.049 -0.056 -0.037 0.020 
 
(0.041)** (0.043)** (0.018)** (0.069)* (0.186) (0.367) 
Leveraget -1.119 -1.116 -1.117 -1.045 -1.051 -1.082 
 
(<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
ROAt 1.245 1.227 1.208 1391 1.272 1.119 
 
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.006)*** 
Free casht 3.839 3.865 3.921 3.449 3.622 4.048 
 
(<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Sales growtht 0.414 0.409 0.415 0.476 0.418 0.474 
 
(0.002)*** (<0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
CEO dualityt -0.154 -0.148 -0.152 -0.226 -0.189 -0.244 
 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Log (Board size)t -0.310 -0.295 -0.306 -0.472 -0.482 -0.575 
 
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (<0.001)*** (0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Proportion of independent directorst 0.306 0.319 0.323 -0.193 0.115 0.030 
 
(0.027)** (0.022)** (0.021)** (0.292) (0.444) (0.846) 
Proportion of busy directorst 0.014 0.043 0.060 -0.421 -0.131 -0.004 
 
(0.912) (0.744) (0.646) (0.011)** (0.341) (0.976) 
Log (1+Directors’ total contributions)t 0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.676 -0.401 -0.101 
 
(0.690) (0.560) (0.435) (0.001)*** (0.015)** (0.476) 
G-indext -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.022 -0.016 -0.015 
 
(0.027)** (0.029)** (0.030)** (0.005)*** (0.045)** (0.063)* 
Intercept 2.279 2.266 2.281 1.500 1.767 1.802 
 
(<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
       
Industry/ year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,482 2,482 2,482 
Adj. R
2
 27.39% 27.26% 27.18% 28.35% 28.35% 28.36% 
Table 5 presents the results of the pooled OLS regressions and the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions that 
examine a relation between political distance measures and firm value. The dependent variable is firm value 
measured by Tobin’s Q. For the 2 SLS, political distances measures are predicted values that are obtained from 
Table 4. The detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix 1. Numbers in parentheses are p-values that are 
adjusted by heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Industry and year dummies are included. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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These economic and statistical significances persist even after considering endogeneity. 
In the 2 SLS results, the coefficients are between 3.340 and 5.902 and they are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The remaining control variables’ coefficients are mostly significant 
and display the expected signs. Specifically, the results show that Tobin’s Q is negatively 
associated with leverage and board size, consistent with the suggestions made in Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) and the empirical findings in Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wells (1998). In addition, firm value is positively associated with sales growth 
and ROA. One may argue that our political distance measure merely represents political capital, 
since the ideology distance measure is constructed from individual PAC donations. That is, 
politically diverse firms’ high valuation may simply reflect rewards for political donations. To 
address this issue, we include the total amount of individual directors’ PAC donations for the 
firm-year, Log (1+Directors’ total contributions), as a control variable. We find that our results 
are not affected by the inclusion of this variable. Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 are 
consistent with the view that diversity of standpoints in corporate boards improves firm value 
because it enhances monitoring effectiveness.  
We also estimate the OLS and 2SLS regressions after splitting our sample into the S&P 
500 group and the non-S&P 500 group to see if our results are sensitive to the random selection 
process used in constructing our sample. We report the separate test results in Appendix 2. The 
2SLS results show a positive association between valuation and board political diversity in both 
groups, while OLS regressions results show that the positive association between board’s 
political ideology diversity and firm performance is mainly found in non-S&P 500 firms. We 
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conclude that sample construction does not appear to be driving our results, especially when 
controlling for endogeneity.11 
In table 6, we address the issue that political ideology diversity variables might be 
capturing the effects of other board characteristics that past studies have suggested are important 
in understanding firm performance. For instance, take directors’ age; senior directors’ political 
values are more likely to be different than those of other directors, as is their effectiveness as 
board members due to their experience. Moreover, Adams and Ferreira (2009) report that boards 
with female directors differ from boards with non-female directors in the context of corporate 
governance. Alam et al. (2011) document that proximity of outside directors’ residence to firm 
headquarters matters in terms of CEO compensation structure. Coles et al. (2011) document that 
firm performance is affected by the percentage of co-opted directors.  
To account for the possibility that our political ideology diversity variables effect on 
performance can be due to the fact that they encompass the other aforementioned effects  , we re-
test the main regression by adding the following variables: 1) the percentage of female directors, 
2) standard deviation of all directors’ age, 3) the standard deviation of insiders’ age and the 
standard deviation of outsiders’ age, 4) the percentage of in-state directors (i.e. directors whose 
residence is the same as the state of a firm’s headquarter), or 5) the percentage of co-opted 
directors (i.e. directors who were elected after an incumbent CEO was hired).   
Table 6 Omitted Variables Problems 
 
Dependent variable: Qt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Using political ideology distance among directors 
Dist_all_dirt 0.338 0.356 0.342 0.361 0.356 0.335 
 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Proportion of female directorst 0.351     
0.347 
 
(0.049)** 
    
(0.059)* 
Standard deviation 
 
0.000 
    
(director’s age)t  
(0.957) 
    
Standard deviation 
  
-0.014 
  
-0.012 
                                                 
11 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for his or her comment on this issue. 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
(insider’s age)t   
(0.003)*** 
  
(0.013)** 
Standard deviation 
  
0.002 
  
0.004 
(outsider’s age)t   
(0.738) 
  
(0.563) 
Proportion of in-state directorst    
-0.033 
 
-0.056 
    
(0.710) 
 
(0.536) 
Proportion of co-opted directorst     
-0.081 -0.094 
     
(0.210) (0.147) 
       
Controlling variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry/ year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 2,497 2,471 2,471 2,500 2,410 2,410 
Adj. R2 27.47% 27.36% 27.55% 27.36% 27.97% 28.14% 
 
Panel B: Using political ideology distance between insider directors and outside directors 
Dist_ins_outt 0.256 0.275 0.268 0.277 0.272 0.253 
 (0.003)*** (<0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
Proportion of female directorst 0.362     0.311 
 (0.044)**     (0.057)* 
Standard deviation  -0.002     
(director’s age)t  (0.832)     
Standard deviation   -0.014   -0.012 
(insider’s age)t   (0.003)***   (0.013)** 
Standard deviation   0.001   0.004 
(outsider’s age)t   (0.872)   (0.560) 
Proportion of in-state directorst    -0.006  -0.057 
    (0.948)  (0.533) 
Proportion of co-opted directorst     -0.077 -0.093 
     (0.233) (0.150) 
       
Controlling variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry/ year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 2,497 2,471 2,471 2,500 2,410 2,410 
Adj. R2 27.35% 27.24% 27.45% 27.24% 27.85% 28.02% 
Panel C: Using political ideology distance between CEO and outside directors 
Dist_CEO_outt 0.175 0.189 0.182 0.189 0.178 0.158 
 
(0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.014)** 
Proportion of female directorst 0.371     0.319 
 
(0.036)**     (0.082)* 
Standard deviation  -0.001    
 
(director’s age)t  (0.871)     
Standard deviation   -0.014   -0.013 
(insider’s age)t   (0.003)***   (0.010)** 
Standard deviation   0.002   0.004 
(outsider’s age)t   (0.823)   (0.576) 
Proportion of in-state directorst    0.007  -0.013 
 
   (0.937)  (0.889) 
Proportion of co-opted directorst     -0.067 -0.084 
 
    (0.304) (0.193) 
       
Controlling variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry/ year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 2,497 2,471 2,471 2,500 2,410 2,410 
Adj. R2 27.29% 27.17% 27.38% 27.17% 27.75% 27.88% 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
This table addresses omitted variable problems and presents the results of the pooled OLS regressions. Model (1), 
(2), (3) and (4) add directors’ gender, age, and location to the baseline regressions. Proportion of female directors is 
a percentage of female directors given a board. Proportion of in-state directors is the percentage of in-state directors 
whose residential address exhibits as same state where a firm’s headquarter is located in. In model (5), an alternative 
measure to capture differences in value in the boardroom followed by Cole et al. (2011). Proportion of co-opted 
directors is the percentage of directors out of outside directors who are elected after a CEO is hired. We alternatively 
use political ideology distance measures in Panels A, B, and C. The detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix 
1. Numbers in parentheses are p-values that are adjusted by heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Control variables 
in Table 5 as well as industry and year dummies are included. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10 % levels, respectively. 
 
 In Panel A of Table 6, we first report results for the model that is based on the 
Dist_all_dir measure of political ideology diversity. Although some demographic characteristics, 
such as directors’ gender or age also influence firm performance, the political ideology 
diversity’s coefficient remains positive and significant at the 1% level. In model (6), where we 
re-run the regression including all aforementioned variables, we obtain a similar result. In Panels 
B and C, we repeat the tests using the other two distance measures, Dist_ins_out and 
Dist_CEO_out, respectively. We find that the coefficients of the political ideology diversity 
measures remain positive and significant throughout. Therefore, our results are robust to 
problems related to omitted variables. 
Two remaining potential concerns with our evidence thus far involve measurement error 
in Tobin’s Q and problems with specific estimation method. Following Ferreira and Matos 
(2008) and Gompers et al. (2010), we implement several robustness tests to mitigate these 
concerns and report the results in Table 7. We use several transformed measures of Tobin’s Q as 
the dependent variables. They are industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, -1/ Tobin’s Q, and log-
transformed Tobin’s Q in model (1), (2), and (3), respectively. We also employ alternative 
estimation methods by running a quintile regression (to address heteroskedasticity), M-estimator 
(to control for outlier effects), and firm-clustering robust regressions. Throughout the 
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regressions, we include controls used in Table 5 but only report the coefficients of the political 
ideology diversity variables in order to save space. We find that the results are robust. 
Table 7 Measurement Error in Tobin’s Q 
 
Industry- 
adjusted Qt+1 
(-1/Q)t+1 ln (Q)t+1 
Quintile 
Regression 
M-estimator 
Firm 
Clustering 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Using political ideology distance among directors 
Dist_all_dirt 0.351 0.072 0.139 0.253 0.182 0.355 
 
(0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.044)** 
       
Controlling variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering No No No Yes No Yes 
Industry / year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 
Adj. R2 20.87% 30.01% 30.82% -- -- 28.34% 
Panel B: Using political ideology distance between insider directors and outside directors 
Dist_ins_outt 0.271 0.053 0.106 0.149 0.116 0.283 
 (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.028)** (0.045)** 
       
Controlling variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering No No No Yes No Yes 
Industry / year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 
Adj. R-Sq 20.72% 29.88% 30.67% -- -- 28.22% 
Panel C: Using political ideology distance between CEO and outside directors 
Dist_CEO_outt 0.190 0.042 0.079 0.116 0.089 0.194 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.030)** (0.061)* 
       
Controlling variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm clustering No No No Yes No Yes 
Industry / year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 
Adj. R-Sq 20.65% 29.89% 30.65% -- -- 28.14% 
This table shows the results of several robustness tests to address measurement error in Q. In model (1), Q is 
adjusted by FF industry median value (Fama and French, 1997). In model (2), we take reverse value of Q multiplied 
by negative 1. In model (3),Q is log-transformed. Model (4), (5) and (6), we employ the quintile regression, the M-
estimator, and firm clustering effects. We alternatively use political ideology distance measures in Panels A, B, and 
C. The detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix 1. Numbers in parentheses are p-values that are adjusted by 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Control variables as well as industry and year dummies used in Table 5 are 
included, but coefficients are omitted for brevity. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, 
respectively. 
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Are boards with more political ideology diversity associated with lower agency costs?  
As seen in our results from Tables 3 to 7, ideologically diverse boards are associated with 
better firm performance. In the next two tables (Table 8 and Table 9), we explore potential 
sources of this effect. We conjecture that, in the spirit of Puglisi and Snyder (2008), if outside 
directors hold different viewpoints from management, the odds of management misbehavior or 
agency costs will be lower. In order to proxy for agency costs, we follow Doukas et al. (2000) 
and Antia et al. (2010) and measure agency costs  as the product of free cash flow (FCF) and an 
indicator of poor performance (Poor growth) that takes one if the firm’s Tobin’s Q is less than 
one, and zero otherwise. 
We find that all three political ideology diversity measures are negatively and 
significantly related to agency costs of free cash flow. Interestingly, other board characteristics 
such as board size, a percentage of busy directors and a percentage of independent directors do 
not seem to be related to agency costs. Based on these results, we conclude that viewpoint 
diversity in corporate boardrooms plays a critical role in reducing agency costs. 
Table 8 Politically Divergent Boards and Agency Costs 
 
Dependent variable: Agency Costs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dist_all_dirt -0.611   
 
(0.006)***   
Dist_ins_outt  -0.612  
  (0.007)***  
Dist_CEO_outt   -0.276 
   (0.091)* 
Log (Assets)t -0.072 -0.069 -0.087 
 
(0.105) (0.131) (0.051)* 
Leveraget 1.043 1.040 1.041 
 
(0.010)* (0.010)* (0.010)* 
Free Casht 3.008 2.993 2.880 
 
(0.043)** (0.043)** (0.052)* 
ROAt 0.536 0.563 0.589 
 
(0.530) (0.507) (0.492) 
CEO dualityt -0.032 -0.038 -0.034 
 
(0.759) (0.716) (0.748) 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
Ln (Board size)t 0.165 0.176 0.189 
 
(0.491) (0.461) (0.430) 
Proportion of independent directorst 0.197 0.173 0.151 
 
(0.575) (0.622) (0.673) 
Proportion of busy directorst 0.269 0.232 0.189 
 
(0.362) (0.424) (0.521) 
Log (1+Directors’ total contributions)t 0.011 0.011 0.008 
 
(0.233) (0.270) (0.389) 
G-indext 0.022 0.021 0.021 
 
(0.342) (0.365) (0.365) 
Intercept -0.096 -0.094 -0.169 
 
(0.854) (0.859) (0.745) 
    
Industry/Year fixed Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 2,500 2,500 2,500 
Adj. R2 6.25% 6.35% 6.01% 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regressing agency costs on political distance measures and other 
control variables. Agency costs are the product of FCF and Poor growth, where FCF is free cash flow normalized 
by assets, and Poor growth is a dummy that equals one if Tobin’s Q is less than one, and zero otherwise. The 
detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix. Numbers in parentheses are p-values that are adjusted by 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors and firm clustering effects. Industry and year dummies are included. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
 
Does board political ideological diversity mitigate insiders’ discretionary power over PAC 
spending?  
In table 9, we examine whether directors’ political ideologies determine corporate-level 
political ideology as reflected in corporate PAC contributions. Cooper et al. (2010) document 
that contributing firms exhibit better market performance possibly due to their ability to build 
relationships with politicians via PACs. However, Aggarwal et al. (2012) and Bebchuk and 
Jackson (2013) denote that PACs are subject to agency problems. We test whether politically 
diverse boards reduce management’s discretionary power over PAC spending decisions. 
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Table 9 Politically Divergent Boards and Corporate PAC 
 Dependent variable: 
 Log (1+Corporate total PAC contributions) PACPolid  Log(Dist_PAC_ins+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Average ( InsiderPolid )t 0.430 0.046    
 
(0.089)* (<0.001)*** 
   Standard deviation ( InsiderPolid )t -0.244 0.000    
 
(0.460) (0.986) 
   Average ( OutsiderPolid )t 0.388 0.021    
 
(0.315) (0.068)* 
   Standard deviation ( OutsiderPolid )t 0.187 -0.008 
   
 
(0.611) (0.508) 
   Dist_all_dirt   
0.102   
   
(<0.001)***   
Dist_ins_outt    0.265  
    (<0.001)***  
Dist_CEO_outt     0.150 
     (<0.001)*** 
Vote ratio t -0.123 -0.006 0.021 0.024 0.025 
 
(0.324) (0.198) (0.002)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Log (Assets)t 1.217 0.035 0.003 -0.004 0.004 
 
(<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (0.462) (0.326) (0.361) 
Leveraget -1.832 -0.086 -0.010 -0.005 -0.009 
 
(0.023)** (0.001)*** (0.736) (0.866) (0.749) 
Free casht 0.475 0.038 0.133 0.115 0.161 
 
(0.785) (0.518) (0.097)* (0.146) (0.042)** 
ROAt -1.295 -0.041 0.112 0.113 0.099 
 
(0.283) (0.322) (0.048)** (0.036)** (0.069)* 
CEO dualityt 0.193 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.015 
 
(0.392) (0.032)** (0.041)** (0.040)** (0.097)* 
Ln (Board size)t 1.441 0.076 -0.082 -0.091 -0.096 
 
(0.020)** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Proportion of independent directorst 1.150 0.081 0.162 0.153 0.162 
 
(0.110) (0.001)** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
Proportion of busy directorst 1.113 0.038 -0.002 -0.009 0.007 
 
(0.181) (0.108) (0.942) (0.752) (0.798) 
Log (1+Directors’ total contributions)t 0.029 0.022 0.073 0.046 0.081 
 
(0.073)* (0.241) (0.008)*** (0.102) (0.002)*** 
G-indext 0.030 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.605) (0.276) (0.049)** (0.034)** (0.033)** 
Intercept -11.694 -0.457 0.170 0.143 0.148 
 
(<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** (<0.001)*** 
      
Industry / year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 2,570 2,570 2,567 2,567 2,567 
Adj. (or Pseudo) R2 34.36% 65.43% 6.26% 13.42% 9.59% 
This table examines a relation between corporate PAC contributions and directors’ political distances, and presents 
the results from the pooled OLS (models (1), (3), (4), and (5)) and Tobit regressions (model (2)). The dependent 
variables are constructed as follows: In model (1), Log (1+Corporate total PAC contributions) represents a log-
transformed total annual dollar value of the corporate PAC contributions. In model (2), PolidPAC is the firm’s 
political ideology reflected in the corporate PAC contribution portfolio. In model (3), (4), and (4), Dist_PAC_ins is 
political ideology distance between firm and insiders, measured by average value of political ideology distance 
between PolidPAC and a member of the inside director group. The detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix 1. 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values that are adjusted by heteroskedastic-robust standard errors and firm clustering 
effects. Industry and year dummies are included. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, 
respectively.  
 
In model (1) of Table 9, we regress the log of the total amount of corporate PAC 
contributions on political variables, firm-level variables, and board characteristics. As indicated 
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by the coefficients on the variables capturing insiders’ and outsiders’ political ideologies, 
Republican-leaning insiders tend to be associated with a larger amount of firm PACs, while 
outside directors’ political ideology has no impact on firm PACs. Firm size, board size, and a 
percentage of independent are positively associated with the amount of PAC contributions. The 
evidence indicates that large and mature firms are more likely to make bigger PAC contributions. 
Not surprisingly, the total amount of PAC contributions by the board is also positively related to 
the total amount of corporate PAC contributions. Firms with directors who individually donate 
more tend to deliver a larger amount of PAC contributions as well. 
In model (2), we investigate whether personal stakeholders’ political value is related to 
firm-level political ideology measured based on the relative amount of corporate PAC 
contributions geared toward Republican versus Democrat politicians. We employ Tobit 
regression to estimate PACPolid as we use it to explain Polid for new directors in Table 2. We find 
that insiders’ political ideology is positively and significantly related to firm-level political 
ideology. In contrast, the coefficient of outside directors’ political ideology, although significant, 
is half of that of insiders’. In addition, large firms and firms with large boards tend to exhibit 
Republican oriented PAC political ideology. In models (3), (4) and (5), we test whether boards’ 
ideological diversity is associated with less insiders’ discretionary power over PAC disbursement 
decisions. The dependent variable in models (3), (4) and (5) is the log-transformed absolute 
value of the distance between PACPolid  and the insiders’ political ideologies. The lower the value 
of this measure the greater the resemblance of insiders’ and corporate PAC spending patterns and 
thus the greater the discretionary power of insiders over corporate PAC contributions. 
Throughout models (3) to (5), we find that board ideological diversity reduces insiders’ 
discretionary power over PAC spending. The coefficients of the political diversity measures 
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range from 0.102 to 0.265, and are significant at the 5% or 1% levels. In model (4), an increase 
in one standard deviation of board ideological diversity between insider and outside directors 
increases approximately 0.0725 (=exp(0.265×0.264)-1) in the distance between the firm’s and 
the insiders’ political ideologies, which is equivalent to about one fourth of one standard 
deviation. In addition, firms located in a Republican leaning county exhibit greater distance 
between the firm’s and the insiders’ political ideologies. While independent boards tend to 
reduce insiders’ discretionary power over PAC spending, a board size is negatively associated 
with the distance the firm’s and the insiders’ political ideologies. Overall, our results complement 
Bebchuk and Jackson’s (2013) work. We suggest that politically diverse boards can help firms 
construct efficient corporate political strategies. 
Conclusion  
We shed light on the role of the board of directors in corporate governance. Although 
traditional corporate governance literature focuses on the role of independent directors in a 
boardroom, several recent empirical studies have raised questions regarding the notion that 
outside-dominated boards improve board effectiveness (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; 
Guthrie et al., 2012). 
In this article, we explore an alternative mechanism that can lead to improved board 
effectiveness. We investigate whether diversity in points of view in corporate boards can affect 
firm performance. We construct measures of board diversity in terms of political ideology using 
political contributions made by individual board members. We show that boards whose members 
display diverse political ideologies are positively associated with Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, 
politically diverse boards are associated with lower agency costs of free cash flow and lower 
odds of sub-optimal management decisions with regards to corporate PAC contributions.   
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In sum, our findings suggest that differences in viewpoints among corporate board 
members are an important mechanism that improves monitoring effectiveness leading to better 
firm performance. 
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Essay 2 
 
The Value and Risk Implications of Corporate Political Strategies 
 
 
Introduction 
Politics matters in the financial markets. As discussed extensively in Kim, Pantzalis, and 
Park (2012) and Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni (2012), a number of recent studies have proven 
that political connections are influential. Nowadays, firms implement diverse strategies by 
making significant contributions to political campaigns (Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov, 
2010), by adding politicians to their board of directors (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2008, 2009), 
and by expanding their lobbying activities (Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, and Van Ness, 2011). Although 
the studies provide important pieces in understanding corporate political connection’s beneficial 
impacts on firm’s operation and value, there is lack of studies that examine the positive 
association between the connections and valuation based on risk implications. 
In a recent paper, Kim, Pantzalis, and Park (2012) suggest this angle in their study of 
political geography and document its risk implications on stock returns. Policy risk, defined as 
uncertainty about the impact of an administration’s future policies, affects firm’s risk-return 
paradigm. As Will Rogers, an American humorist and entertainer, first popularized this in a New 
York Times article in 1930, a widely shared popular view has been that congressional activity 
interferes with markets and injects uncertainty about the future. Therefore, investors find their 
investments harder when assessing any policies’ impacts on firms’ growth opportunities and the 
stream of future cash flows. 
We posit that corporations are required to manage such policy risk in a proper manner as 
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they hedge out other types of risk such as interest rate and foreign exchange risk. In this article, 
we explore what implications corporate political strategies generate with regard to firm valuation 
and risk. We first test how local politicians’ activities, measured by the number of bills they 
propose in Congress, affect local stock returns. More precisely, we count the number of bills 
introduced by the home-state senators and house representatives in Congress, and examine stock 
performance. We then construct corporate political connections in multi-dimensions; (1) we 
restrict firms to having at least one ex-politician on the board, (2) we also utilize the data of 
electoral candidates’ political action committees (PACs) and request firms donate hard money to 
the candidates, or (3) we require firms to involve in lobbying activities.  
We ask three main questions in this project. Do political connections effectively mitigate 
policy risks? Do political connections help a firm acquire lucrative procurement contracts from 
the government? Do political connections embolden firms into partaking in illegal activities 
while pursuing extra benefits? 
Results show that the political contributions effectively mitigate policy risk. The 
effectiveness is greater when firms PAC donations are directed toward more politicians and 
politicians who have better ability and more power. Lobbying activities turn out to be a good 
strategy in managing policy risk. Time-series and cross-sectional results show that high abnormal 
stock returns, caused by policy risk, are significantly reduced by firm’s political activities. Based 
on our asset pricing tests, when firms’ overall political activities are relatively weak, firms with 
high policy risk outperform those with low policy risk on a risk adjusted basis by about 20 basis 
points per month. However, the gap shrinks to 7 basis points per month if firms are strongly 
connected to politics.  
When we explore the litigation data, we find interesting evidence that politically 
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connected firms are more likely to be sued by investors. There are two reasons why politically 
connected firms could appear to be sued more. First, connected firms tend to act in a bold 
manner and flirt with illegal activities. This could be because they feel that they are more 
protected. Second, firms may pursue political connections in their anticipation of the eventuality 
of having legal issues. Consistent with our prediction, our tests reveal that firms pursuing all 
three political strategies (i.e. having a connected board, making PAC contributions and lobbying) 
exhibit a 7% chance of being sued, compared to a mere 2% likelihood for their peers that do not 
have any active political strategy. Our evidence is in line with Chaney, Faccio, and David Parsley 
(2011) who documents that politically connected firms exhibit poorer quality of disclosure than 
their non-connected peers. They suggest that politically connected firms that protect themselves 
against a potential litigation threat have a better chance to achieve greater benefits when high 
information asymmetry exists between insiders and investors. 
Litigation is negatively associated with stock return. However, we find that the poor 
performance related to litigation can be recovered by political connections. Inconsistent with a 
common expectation that that political connections can play a crucial role to hedge against 
litigation risks by decreasing amounts of settlement for pending lawsuits or increasing the 
probability of being dismissed by the court, our additional results reveal that political 
connections do not seem to reduce the amount of settlement or dismissal. 
Overall, we conclude that corporate political strategies are beneficial. Firm’s stock 
performance is superior when they are connected to the political power. When firms face policy 
risk, political strategies are viewed as a useful hedging tool against policy risks. But our study 
also points out the other aspect of political connections, showing that firm’s political activities 
lead firms more exposure to risk in politics. Although politically connected firms successfully 
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secure procurement contracts, they are also more likely to be in trouble with legal issues. 
In practice, many firms often employ various types of corporate political strategies 
together. In the following test, we examine whether three strategies and their effects are 
substitute or complement when it is in place. We find that firms employ multi-dimensions in 
their political hedging activities instead of focusing on one particular strategy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides related literature 
review and constructs hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data selection process, section 4 
contains a description of the test methodologies and results, and section 5 provides concluding 
remarks. 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
There are many papers that investigate whether political connections12 affect firm value, 
but conclusions are far from unanimous. One stream of literature supports the political capital 
view that political connections enhance firm value (e.g., Faccio, 2006 and others13). For instance, 
Faccio (2006) in a cross-country study finds that the market positively greets announcements that 
CEOs, other executives, or one of large shareholders take a political position and argues that this 
finding is consistent with the notion that firms are expected to receive benefits from connections. 
Goldman et al. (2009) document that firms with a board member who is connected to the 
winning party in an upcoming U.S. election, experience abnormal returns around the election 
dates.  
                                                 
12 Recent political connection literature extends its scope by establishing a link between a political 
connection and a various dimension of corporate policies. Aslan and Grinstein (2011) find that politically connected 
CEOs receive a higher compensation package than their non-connected peers. Kusnadi and Wei (2011) report cross-
country evidence that politically connected firms hoard superfluous cash that subjects to more agency problems than 
non-connected firms. Francis et al. (2009) uncover that, in the Chinese market, politically connected firms exhibit 
lower underpricing than non-connected firms. 
13 Among the many papers espousing this view, please note Robert (1990), Kroszner and Stratmann (1998), 
Fisman (2001), Sapienza (2004), Dinc (2005), Khwaja and Mian (2005) Faccio (2006), Fisman et al. (2006), 
Mobarak and Purbasari (2006), Faccio and Parsley (2007), Jayachandran (2006), Shon (2006), Knight (2006), 
Claessens et al. (2008), Goldman et al.(2009), Cooper et al. (2010) and Hill et al. (2011). 
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The political capital view has also been tested and gained support within the empirical 
framework of exogenous political events, such as a sudden death of local politicians (Faccio and 
Parsley, 2007), illness of the Indonesian President Mr. Suharto (Fisman, 2001), Richard Cheney’s 
announcement of illness and appointment as the U.S. vice-president candidate (Fisman, 2006), 
shift of the U.S. Senatorial control (Jayachandran, 2006). Other studies have used campaign 
donations (e.g., Clasessens et al., 2008, and Cooper et al., 2010) and lobbying expenditure (Hill 
et al., 2011) as alternative political connection measures and provided evidence that supports the 
political capital view. Additionally,  political connections have been shown to not only lead to 
outperformance, but also help firms access cheaper financing through equity (Boubakri et al., 
2012), public debt (Bliss and Gul, 2012) and bank loans (Claessens et al., 2008; Houston et 
al.,2012). Although much of the literature supports the political capital view, it has still not 
provided exhaustive evidence on the specific channels through which connections affect firm 
valuation.  
There is another stream of research that emphasizes that a relation between political 
connections and firm value is endogenous. For instance, Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) show that 
firms doing more business with a government are more willing to appoint a director who had a 
political position in the past. Hence, a priori it is hard to say whether the entire valuation effect is 
driven by a political connection. Ansolabehere et al. (2003) and Ansolabehere et al. (2004) and 
Hersch et al. (2008) show that political contributions have no significant impact on a legislator’s 
voting behavior and a firm’s value. Furthermore, Aggarwal et al. (2012) document that, in fact, 
contributing firms underperform non-contributing firms, because campaign donations are more 
likely a symptom of agency problems. Kang and Zhang (2012) uphold Aggarwal et al.’s (2012) 
findings by providing evidence in line with the view that politically connected directors are not 
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as effective as other outside directors when monitoring and advising managers. 
Given the on-going debate about whether or not political connections add value to firms, 
we want to contribute to the literature by unraveling this controversial matter. Moreover, we 
attempt to reveal certain channels through which political connections are expected to affect 
valuation. Our first goal is to demonstrate that political connections can function as a hedging 
mechanism against policy risk.  
Several recent studies explore whether policy risk affects asset value. Sialm (2006, 
2009) and Croce et al. (2012) investigate whether uncertainty about tax policy affects both bond 
and equity prices and report that it is indeed the case. Cohen et al. (2011) examine the effect of 
policy risk on corporate policy and value under “changes in congressional committee 
chairmanship.” If one of the local politicians is appointed as a chairman of a congressional 
committee, a politician’s home state obtains an additional federal outlay, government fund 
transfers, and contracts. An increase in available state funds discourages local corporate 
investment, employment, and productivity in effect creating a “crowding out” effect. Belo et al. 
(2011) argue that government policy is primarily shaped by the level of partisanship14. In 
general, a firm’s exposure to government spending has no impact on stock returns, however 
government policy implemented by different (Democratic or Republican) administrations does 
matter. Cohen et al. (2011) document that, after the passage of bills, firms headquartered in a 
legislator’s home state experience positive abnormal returns. The phenomenon is more 
pronounced for an “interested” group, which comprises of firms belonging to a specific industry 
corresponding to each bill15. Pastor and Veronesi (2011) theoretically analyze the impact of 
                                                 
14 Alesina (1987, 1988) provides the rational partisan model of a business cycle showing that fiscal policies 
differ by the government’s type. Therefore, the impact of fiscal policies on the economy varies with the degree of 
uncertainty about upcoming election outcomes. 
15 However, this method could be problematic since every single bill cannot be matched with a specific 
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uncertainty about government policy on stock prices. A key feature of their model is dividing 
uncertainty arising from government policy into two parts: “political uncertainty” associated 
with changes in policy and “impact uncertainty” associated with the magnitude of the effect on 
stock price when a policy is implemented. They show that both types of uncertainty affect stock 
prices. Kim et al. (2011) measure policy risk after general elections held every two years in the 
U.S. using the degree of state politicians’ partisan alignment with the incumbent president (PAI). 
Firms in high PAI areas experience higher positive abnormal returns than those located in low 
PAI areas in both time-series and cross-sectional tests, consistent with the notion that policy risk, 
as reflected in a dynamically changing political map, affects stock returns. Overall, regardless of 
the type of policy risk proxy used, the notion that policy risk affects firm value has gained strong 
scholarly support. Motivated by Cohen et al.’s (2011) work, we count the number of bills 
introduced by state congressmen (either Senator or House representatives) and use it as a proxy 
for policy risk. We then empirically test whether political connections play a role in diversifying 
policy risks away. Hence, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H5: Political connections function as effective corporate political strategies that can provide a 
hedge against policy risk. 
 
Although much of this line of literature focuses on identifying a relation between 
political connections and firm value, extant literature documents avenues of value creation 
originated from political connections. Sapienza (2004) finds that state-owned Italian banks lend 
money to politically connected firms with lower interest rates than non-connected peers. Dinç 
(2005) documents that politicians influence state-owned banks to lend more funds to private 
banks before elections. Adhikari et al. (2006) demonstrate that Malaysian firms exhibit a low 
                                                                                                                                                             
industry classification, often used by finance research (e.g., FF 48-industry classification). For instance, a bill 
dealing with the minimum wage is proposed. The bill significantly impacts the operating cost of firms but is hard to 
link the bill to a specific industry.  
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effective tax rate when they are politically connected. Faccio et al. (2006) document that, in an 
international setting, politically connected firms are given priority when government aid funds 
are allocated. This is documented by Duchin and Sosyura’s (2011) in the United States. Goldman 
et al. (2010) find that firms connected to the party in power are more likely to obtain profitable 
government contracts. The conclusion drawn from the aforementioned studies is that politically 
connected firms are somehow treated favorably when doing business with the government. In 
our investigation, we also extend Goldman et al.’s (2010) work, and look at the relation between 
different types of corporate political strategies (i.e. those that result in either direct or indirect 
political connections) and procurement contracts.  
H6: Political connections are positively associated with a number of procurement contracts that 
a firm obtains from the government in a given year 
 
Lastly, we explore the likelihood that politically connected firms engage in illegal 
activity and the market reactions for litigation announcements of politically connected firms 
versus firms that lack corporate political strategies. Chaney et al. (2011) find that politically 
connected firms exhibit a lower quality of disclosure than non-connected peers. Chaney et al. 
argue that politically connected firms do not feel the necessity to keep the most transparent level 
of accounting information disclosure. This is because connected firms find it easier to exploit 
economic rents under high opaqueness and more likely to be protected even when less 
transparency becomes an issue. Firth et al. (2011) document that Chinese state-owned firms (i.e., 
by definition politically connected firms) have a higher likelihood of being sued than non-state-
owned firms. State-owned firms, however, are more likely to appeal and an outcome of appeal 
often favors them. Therefore we hypothesize that politically connected firms tend to engage in 
illegal activities to obtain extra benefits behind political connections and therefore, their 
46 
 
connectedness is more likely to result in more lawsuits16.  
H7a: Politically connected firms have a higher probability of being sued due to illegal activities 
than firms that do not have political connections. 
 
H7b: Politically connected firms are more likely to protect shareholders’ wealth upon litigation 
than firms that do not have political connections. 
 
Data Selection and Variable Description 
A major contribution of our paper is that it provides evidence from a large, 
comprehensive dataset. We construct a fairly large and diverse set of political variables at the 
firm- and state-levels and utilize them in our investigation of political connection and its effects 
on stock returns. We will introduce them with detailed information on data sources and 
constructions in the following sub-sections.  
Directors’ political experience 
To identify a political connections that are based on the composition of a firm’s board of 
directors, we search Form 10-K and Form 10-Q filings reported in the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (i.e., using the EDGAR database17). Information that we collected from 
the EDGAR includes a firm’s name, a filing date, types of filing, central index key (CIK), and 
every director’s name and short biography. While we are able to tell a director’s political 
experience by reading his/hers individual biography, we also account for the many cases where 
the biographical information is either missing or incomplete by obtain lists of the U.S. 
politicians18 from various sources19, which provide information on a politician’s former or 
                                                 
16 Yu and Yu (2011) find that lobbying firms, in fact, are less likely to be detected their fraudulent 
activities than non-lobbying firms. However, Yu and Yu’s (2011) work did not specify whether or not lobbying 
firms tends to engage in fraudulent activities. 
17 The master file can be downloaded from the website (ftp://ftp.sec.gov/edgar/full-index/). This file 
contains the URL of filings reported in the SEC website.  
18 Lists cover historical information on the U.S. president, vice President, and candidates, secretaries of 
departments (e.g., Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense etc.), governors, Senators and House representatives, 
Attorney Generals, White House Executives, SEC commissioners, ambassadors, as well as assistant and deputy 
secretaries of all departments.  
47 
 
incumbent political position, party affiliation, years taking on the position and resigning from the 
position. After extracting this information into a politicians list file, we use the politicians’ names 
to link it with the file containing the information extracted from EDGAR. This procedure enables 
us to construct a rich dataset that measures various ways a firm’s board can provide the firm with 
political connectedness.  
We develop two main political connection measures using corporate board information: 
the number of politically connected directors and a director’s political “freshness”, i.e. the time 
elapsed since the director held his/her last political position. These variables capture the degree 
and quality of the board’s connectedness. Further detailed definitions of variables are reported in 
Appendix A.    
Corporate political contributions and lobbying expenditures 
We also devise measures of alternative corporate political strategies based on two types 
of politics-related corporate expenditures that are publicly recorded: corporate contributions to 
U.S. political campaigns and lobbying expenditures. Following Cooper et al. (2010), we extract 
the corporate contributions data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) summary files on 
political contributions to House and Senate election campaigns. We construct four measures of 
corporate political contributions: 1) Number of supported candidates is the number of  politicians 
running for office supported by the firm; 2) Strength of relationships with supported candidates 
is the strength of the relationships between candidates and the contributing firm, measured by the 
total length of relationships between the firm and the candidates; 3) Supported candidates’ ability 
is the ability of the candidates to help the firm, measured by the home state of the firm and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 Some example of sources are as follows: for the U.S. President 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States), the U.S. House of Representatives 
(http://www.house.gov/), the U.S. Senator (http://www.senate.gov/), and secretaries of department(e.g., secretary of 
Defense (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense) and secretary of the Treasury 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_the_Treasury), etc. 
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candidate; and 4) Supported candidates’ power is measured by the candidate’s committee 
ranking.  
We collect corporate lobbying expenditures from the OpenSecrets 
(http://www.opensecrets.org), which tracks the influence of money on U.S. politics and how that 
money affects policy and citizens’ lives. After passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 
the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives are required to disclose 
lobbying-related information, verify its accuracy, and compile lobbying data. Data includes filing 
dates for lobbying activities, lobbying amounts, registrant name and address, client’s name and 
address and industry classification related to a bill in which a firm’s lobbying activity is 
involved. To provide more specific example, 3M Co. filed its year-end report on March 07, 2002 
that account for lobbying activities occurred during July 1st, 2001 through December 31st, 2001. 
The total lobbying amount comes to $877,100 that spent to 27 different industry-specific bills. 
The main drawback of data is that we are not able to track how much money spends on a specific 
bill, and thus we measure corporate lobbying expenditures by aggregating all reported expenses 
by firm and year. 
Policy risk 
In recent studies, Kim, Pantzalis, and Park (2012), Cohen and Malloy (2010) and Cohen 
et al. (2011) show that a major source of policy risk is uncertainty surrounding legislative 
activity. A widely shared popular view is that congressional activity interferes with markets and 
injects uncertainty about the future. Will Rogers, an American humorist and entertainer, first 
popularized this view in a July 5th, 1930, New York Times article where he wrote that “this 
country has come to feel the same when Congress is in session as when the baby gets hold of a 
hammer.” This notion has also found empirical support in studies that examined the relation of 
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the congressional calendar with market returns (Lamb et al, 1997; Ferguson and Witte, 2006). 
We argue that legislators often draft, sponsor and/or amend bills with an eye on firms located in 
the geographic area that constitutes their political home, and especially those firms with whom 
they are connected (see, e.g. Roberts, 1990; Jayachandran, 2006). Such legislative activity 
creates uncertainty regarding the redistribution of future growth opportunities among firms 
within an industry and/or state and can generate the perception of higher risk among investors 
(Kim et al., 2012).  
In sum, we expect that a policy risk arises in the form of high levels of legislative activity 
generated by local politicians who are powerful and effective in drafting. We therefore utilize a 
measure of local politicians’ legislative activity by capturing how actively the firm’s home state 
politicians introduce bills in Congress. We trace the information on each congressional bill, 
collected from the Congressional Bills Project (http://www.congressionalbills.org/index.html), 
and count the total number of bills introduced by home-state politicians over a calendar year. The 
larger the number of bills introduced by the senators and house representatives of a particular 
state in Congress, the greater the level of legislative activity-induced uncertainty will surround 
firms located in the state.  
Return data and other firm characteristics 
Our data on stock prices and outstanding shares for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ are 
obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for the period from 1999 to 
2008. From Compustat, we obtain annual data on accounting variables and the locations of firms’ 
headquarters. We assign firms to geographic locations based on headquarter or home office 
address information. Since Compustat provides only the latest address information without 
showing historical changes of firm location, we use the detailed address information from 
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Compact Disclosure to account for address changes. We then require a firm to have financial and 
accounting data on CRSP and Compustat.  
We also gather litigation information from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
maintained by Stanford Law School. This website20 provides information related to securities 
fraud lawsuits, which covers litigation filing date, class period starting and ending date, 
complaints, defendants, verdict, and settlement since 1996. This data has been used as a primary 
source to investigate litigation-related studies in finance research. For instance, Gande and Lewis 
(2009) examine the market reactions to lawsuit announcements. McTier and Wald (2011) explore 
factors that affect the likelihood of lawsuit and consequence following a lawsuit. We define a 
litigation dummy equals 1 if a firm face litigation a given calendar year y, and otherwise 0 
(McTier and Wald, 2011).   
Empirical Results 
In this section we explore the effect of corporate political connections on future returns. 
Before introducing the various empirical tests, we present the descriptive statistics of the sample 
that includes 71,269 firm-years over the period from 1994 to 2008. In Table 1 our sample 
displays the mean policy risk (the number of bills introduced by the state politicians) of 172 per 
year. On average, our sample firms have 0.136 connected members on their board with a 
maximum of 7. On average, firms support 9.46 candidates in political campaigns and spend 
$124K on lobbying. The median market value of equity is 177 million dollars with a mean book-
to-market ratio of 0.53.  
The average raw return is 0.96% per month, and the average 12-month abnormal return 
adjusted by the market is 3.32%. In addition, we measure the abnormal return using a matching 
firm as a benchmark, BHAR (match). The matching firm benchmark is constructed as follows: In 
                                                 
20 Detailed litigation information can be found at http://securities.stanford.edu. 
51 
 
the beginning of January, we classify the sample firms into sub-groups independently based on 
the 11 industries as defined in the appendix and the terciles of firm size, book-to-market, and 
past one-year returns and compute the median buy-and-hold return (BHR) over the 12-month 
period for each sub-group. Then, to construct a firm’s BHAR, we subtract the industry-, size-, 
growth-, and momentum-matched BHR from the firm’s BHR. The mean of the 12-month 
abnormal return by matching-firm method is 8.89%. 
Table 10 Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
Policy risk 71,269 172 150 6 118 832 
Corporate political strategies 
Number of politically connected board members 71,269 0.1361 0.4553 0.0000 0.0000 7.000 
Board’s political freshness 68,985 2.8357 10.1458 0.0000 0.0000 50.000 
Number of supported candidates 71,269 9.4630 42.8489 0.0000 0.0000 766 
Strength of relationships with supported candidates 71,269 557 6592 0.0000 0.0000 725070 
Supported candidates’ ability 71,269 4.0333 108 0.0000 0.0000 12617 
Supported candidates’ power 71,269 1.2417 10.8459 0.0000 0.0000 532 
Lobbying expenditures (million $) 50,773 0.1236 0.8179 0.0000 0.0000 29.3685 
PSI 71,269 0.5091 0.2135 0.0040 0.5049 0.9999 
Firm characteristics 
BHAR 71,269 0.0332 0.6266 -0.9798 -0.0604 2.9889 
BHAR (ew) 71,269 0.0364 0.8577 -1.5643 -0.0762 37.3865 
BHAR (match) 71,269 0.0889 0.5628 -0.9254 0.0000 2.814099 
Average monthly return 71,269 0.0096 0.0490 -0.1288 0.0082 0.1762 
Procurement amount (million $) 71,269 16.8261 377 0.0000 0.0000 31061 
Litigation 71,269 0.0210 0.1434 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Size (million $) 71,269 1534 4529 0.1925 177 31118 
B/M 71,269 0.6505 0.5734 -0.4068 0.5255 3.3705 
Beta 71,269 0.8381 0.8392 -1.3492 0.7383 3.5155 
Past return 71,269 0.1724 0.6592 -0.8313 0.0667 3.2967 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of 71,269 firm-year observations. Policy risk = the number 
of bills introduced by the home-state senators and house representatives over the year y. Number of politically 
connected board members = the number of board members who are politically connected. Board’s political freshness 
= board’s political freshness based on directors’ elapse period. Number of supported candidates = the number of 
supported candidates. Strength of relationships with supported candidates = the strength of the relationships between 
candidates and the contributing firm. Supported candidates’ ability = the ability of the candidates to help the firm. 
Supported candidates’ power = the power of the candidates. Lobbying expenditures (million $) = corporate total 
lobbying expenditures in million dollars. PSI = the political strategy index that combines the yearly ranks of Number 
of politically connected board members, Number of supported candidates, and Lobbying expenditures. BHAR = the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return over 12 months, computed as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of firm i 
from January to December of year y and the buy-and-hold return of the value-weighted market portfolio over the 
same period. BHAR (ew) = the buy-and-hold abnormal return over 12 months, computed as the difference between 
the buy-and-hold return of firm i from January to December of year y and the buy-and-hold return of the equally-
weighted market portfolio over the same period. BHAR (match) = the buy-and-hold abnormal return, adjusted by a  
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
matching firm. In the beginning of each year, we classify the sample firms into sub-groups based on an 11-industry 
classification and into terciles of the previous year’s firm size, B/M, and one-year return. From each sub-group, we 
collect the median buy-and-hold return (BHR) over 12 months, from January to December of year y. Then, we 
compute BHAR (match) as the difference between each sample firm’s BHR and its matched BHR. Average monthly 
return = the average of raw monthly returns in year y. Procurement amount = the sum of all procurement contracts 
in the year in million dollars. Litigation = a dummy that equals 1 if the lawsuit is filled a given calendar year y, and 
otherwise equals 0. Size (million $) = the market value of common equity in million dollars. Beta = beta, computed 
using weekly returns. Past return = previous stock return in year y-1. Refer to appendix for detailed variable 
descriptions. 
 
Political connections and stock returns 
We start our empirical tests by comparing the stock performances of portfolios 
constructed by a policy risk and the degree of a board’s political connectedness. More 
specifically, we divided sample firms into less-politically connected vs. more-politically 
connected groups and then, in each group, compare stock returns between firms located in high 
policy risk states with those located in low policy risk states.21 If political connections can serve 
as an effective hedging mechanism against policy risk, we expect to see the performance 
differential between the high and low policy risk portfolios to be sizeable and significant for the 
less-politically connected group and insignificant for the more-politically connected group.  
In Panel A of Table 11, we examine differences in BHARs, i.e. market-adjusted buy-and-
hold returns over each calendar year y. Since we employ four different  political connection 
measures (politicians on board, PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures and the Political 
Strategy Index, PSI), we report four pairs of BHARs, for the less connected and the more 
connected groups, respectively. Overall, the results are consistent with our prediction regardless 
of a type of political connection. For firms in the less-politically connected group, differences in 
BHARs between firms located in high vs. low policy risk states are significantly positive. For the 
more-politically connected group, however, the differences in performance are not statistically 
                                                 
21 To clarify our empirical procedure, we simply use the median value of variables when we split sample 
into two groups. For instance, firms are classified into the low (high) policy risk group if the total number of bills 
introduced by state politicians where a firm’s headquarter resides is lower (higher) than the median value in year y.   
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significant. For instance, when firms are in the low PSI group, firms in a high policy risk state 
outperform in terms of BHAR those in a low policy risk state by an average of 1.98% per annum, 
a return differential that is statistically significant at 1 % level. In the next column, the 
corresponding performance differential is statistically insignificant. This phenomenon is 
observed for all three other political connection measures. 
In Panel B we examine the risk-adjusted return performance of zero net investment 
portfolios formed by buying high policy risk firms and selling low policy risk firms using a time-
series asset pricing model that includes the market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors. 
The monthly return of the zero-investment portfolio is the difference in returns between the high 
( HighPolicyRisk
m
r ) and the low ( LowPolicyRisk
m
r ) policy risk groups. The asset pricing model for the zero 
investment portfolio returns is as follows: 
HighPolicyRisk
m
r – LowPolicyRisk
m
r  = β
0
 + β
1
 ( m
m
r – f
m
r ) + β
2
 smb
m
 + β
3
 hml
m
 + β
4
 umd
m
 + e
m
.  (1) 
where m
m
r = the value-weighted market return and f
m
r
 
= the one-month Treasury bill rate. smb 
(small minus big) = the difference each month between the return on small and big firms, while 
hml (high minus low) = the monthly difference of the returns on a portfolio of high book-to-
market and low book-to-market firms. umd (up minus down) = the momentum factor computed 
on a monthly basis as the return differential between a portfolio of winners and a portfolio of 
losers. We use 180 monthly observations spanning from January 1994 to December 2008.  
The results are quite similar to the ones obtained from the BHARs analysis in Panel A. 
The zero net investment portfolio generates significant returns only among firms that are less 
politically connected. Among less-politically connected groups, at 0.27% per month, the 
difference in abnormal monthly returns (alphas) between firms with a high vs. a low policy risk 
is the highest when we measure political connection by the level of lobbying expenditures. 
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Consistent with the notion that political connections can serve as effective policy risk hedging 
tools, firms with more connected board members, with more candidates supported, with more 
lobbying expenditures, or with a higher PSI present stock returns in high policy risk 
environment, which are presumably same as the returns obtained from low policy risk 
environment. Collectively, evidence indicates that higher returns are expected for those firms that 
are deemed to be improperly prepared to deal with uncertainty on future policies and their 
impacts. In contrast, when firms implement corporate political strategies in place, it is viewed 
that political strategies will effectively diversify policy risk away without incurring policy-risk 
returns.  
Table 11 Comparisons of BHARs and Time-series Tests 
Panel A: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 12 months 
 
 
Fewer Number of politically connected board 
members 
More Number of politically connected board 
members 
High Policy risk – Low Policy risk 
0.0140*** 
(2.78) 
0.0079 
(0.64) 
 
 
Fewer Number of supported candidates More Number of supported candidates 
High Policy risk – Low Policy risk 
0.0143*** 
(2.77) 
0.0031 
(0.33) 
 
 
Low Lobbying expenditures High Lobbying expenditures 
High Policy risk – Low Policy risk 
0.0266*** 
(4.18) 
-0.0138 
(-1.17) 
 
 
Low PSI High PSI 
High Policy risk – Low Policy risk 
0.0198*** 
(2.84) 
0.0068 
(1.08) 
Panel B: Time-series tests of Fama-French 4 factor model 
 
 
Fewer Number of politically connected board 
members 
More Number of politically connected board 
members 
α of the arbitrage portfolio  
(
HighPolicyRisk
m
R –
LowPolicyRisk
m
R ) 
0.0017** 
(2.13) 
-0.0001 
(-0.06) 
 
 
Fewer Number of supported candidates More Number of supported candidates 
α of the arbitrage portfolio  
(
HighPolicyRisk
m
R –
LowPolicyRisk
m
R ) 
0.0015** 
(2.09) 
0.0002 
(0.23) 
 
 
Low Lobbying expenditures High Lobbying expenditures 
α of the arbitrage portfolio  
(
HighPolicyRisk
m
R –
LowPolicyRisk
m
R ) 
0.0027*** 
(2.83) 
0.0001 
(0.09) 
 
 
Low PSI High PSI 
α of the arbitrage portfolio  
(
HighPolicyRisk
m
R –
LowPolicyRisk
m
R ) 
0.0021** 
(2.52) 
0.0008 
(1.04) 
 
55 
 
Table 11 (Continued) 
 
Panel A reports the difference in BHARs between the high and low Policy risk portfolios. BHAR is the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return over 12 months, computed as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of firm i from January 
to December of year y and the buy-and-hold return of the value-weighted market portfolio over the same period. 
Policy risk is the total number of bills introduced by the home-state politicians over the year y. PSI = the political 
strategy index that combines the yearly ranks of Number of politically connected board members, Number of 
supported candidates, and Lobbying expenditures. Number of politically connected board members = the number of 
board members who are politically connected. Number of supported candidates = the number of supported 
candidates. Lobbying expenditures = corporate total lobbying expenditures. A firm is classified into the low (high) 
group if any considered variable is lower (higher) than the median value in year y. Panel B reports the estimated 
intercept coefficients (i.e., the “alphas” or abnormal returns) in the time-series tests of the four-factor models for the 
monthly returns of arbitrage portfolios computed as the difference in returns between the high and low Policy risk 
portfolios. The sample includes 180 monthly observations spanning from January 1994 to December 2008. Refer to 
the appendix for detailed variable descriptions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
In the cross-sectional tests shown in next four tables, we separately explore the 
effectiveness of each political strategy as a hedging mechanism against a policy risk. First, we 
focus our analysis on the effect of directors’ implicit political ties on policy risk. As mentioned 
before, we construct two distinct variables to gauge a degree of corporate board political 
connectedness. 
1) Number of politically connected board members: Following Goldman et al. (2009), we 
count the number of politically connected board members. To be considered politically 
connected, a board member must have held one of the following political positions in her/his 
career: U.S. president, vice President, and candidates, secretary, assistant secretary or deputy 
secretary of a department, Governor, Senator, House representative, Attorney General, White 
House Executive, SEC commissioner, and ambassador. If none of board members is politically 
connected, then the value of this first measure of the board’s political connectedness is set equal 
to zero. A larger number of politically connected directors represent a firm that possesses more 
diverse channels that can be used to access political power. 
2) Board’s political freshness: We compute political freshness for each board member by 
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50 minus  the number of years elapsed since the director last held his/her political position.22 
After collecting the freshness scores from all directors, we compute the average freshness for 
each firm’s board. If none of board members is politically connected, value of a board’s political 
freshness is equal to zero. A higher score of politically freshness represents a higher likelihood 
that the directors’ ties to the political machine are still strong and therefore potentially more 
beneficial to the firm. 
Table 12 reports results of pooled OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. Model [I] documents the relationship between the policy risk and equity price without 
including a political connection variable. The estimated coefficient on policy risk is 0.0321 (t= 
11.73). This magnitude is statistically significant and economically sizable. The estimate implies 
that if a policy risk is changed by one standard deviation (i.e., 150 bills), the implied increase in 
the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return is 16.08% (0.0321 ln(150)).  
In model [II], we include the number of politically connected directors as an independent 
variable. The estimated coefficient of the number of politically connected directors is 0.0348, 
which is significant at the 1% level. To illustrate the magnitude of the effect implied by this 
coefficient, consider the following: if a firm appointed an additional director who held an 
influential political position in the past, the firm is expected to yield a BHAR that is 3.48% higher 
than an otherwise similar firm without any additional politically connected directors. In model 
[III], the estimated coefficient of a board’s freshness is also positive and statistically significant 
(0.0147, t=6.33). The evidence on this positive relationship may highlight a beneficial effect of 
political connections. The results also support a view that political activities firms show are risk 
                                                 
22 We observe that few directors have negative values on the elapse period variable, showing that they were 
a director while holding a political position. We find that the results hold even after dropping these directors from 
the sample. 
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to investors. Alternatively, it could be simply a mispricing in that the market is quite slow in 
capitalizing information related to firm’s political activities into prices. 
Our main concern in this table is on how political connections play a role in diversifying 
a policy risk. To address this issue, we introduce the interaction term of policy risk with each of 
the two political connection variables in Models [IV] and [V], respectively. In both cases, the 
interaction term coefficient is negative and significant, which is consistent with the notion that 
political connections can serve as effective risk management tools against policy risk. For 
instance, in Model [IV] the coefficient of policy risk is 0.0351. If a firm has one politically 
connected director on its board, the effect of policy risk is dramatically reduced by 0.0224. 
Therefore, we conclude that there exists a substitute relation between a policy risk and a political 
connection.   
Note that in the regressions shown in Table 3 beta and past return variables have negative 
coefficients, which are opposite to conventional finance sense. This has been commonly reported 
when long-term returns are regressed on variables computed based on past stock returns such as 
beta and past return (e.g., Cooper et al., 2010). We find that this irregularity can be corrected if 
concurrent beta is controlled when short-term return (e.g., one-month BHAR) is used as the 
dependent variable. Therefore, the negative signs on the estimated coefficients of beta and 
previous returns are mainly the result of the way the model is formed.   
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Table 12 Political Characteristics of Corporate Boards and Stock Returns 
Dependent variable = BHAR [I] [II] [III] [IV] [V] 
Policy risk 0.0321*** 0.0321*** 0.0332*** 0.0351*** 0.0347*** 
 (11.73) (11.72) (11.91) (12.22) (11.86) 
Number of politically connected board members  0.0348***  0.1436***  
  (7.39)  (6.17)  
Board’s political freshness   0.0147***  0.0408*** 
   (6.33)  (3.42) 
Policy risk * Number of politically connected board members    -0.0224***  
    (-4.75)  
Policy risk * Board’s political freshness     -0.0055** 
     (-2.18) 
Size -0.0058*** -0.0082*** -0.0080*** -0.0081*** -0.0079*** 
 (-4.44) (-5.96) (-5.66) (-5.92) (-5.60) 
B/M 0.1211*** 0.1196*** 0.1201*** 0.1197*** 0.1202*** 
 (18.96) (18.70) (18.44) (18.71) (18.45) 
Beta -0.0184*** -0.0180*** -0.0180*** -0.0183*** -0.0181*** 
 (-5.38) (-5.25) (-5.16) (-5.34) (-5.20) 
Past return -0.0168*** -0.0161*** -0.0159*** -0.0161*** -0.0159*** 
 (-3.78) (-3.62) (-3.51) (-3.61) (-3.51) 
Constant -0.1370*** -0.0956*** -0.1081*** -0.1116*** -0.1167*** 
 (-4.51) (-3.04) (-3.37) (-3.52) (-3.59) 
      
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N. of observations 71,269 71,269 68,985 71,269 68,985 
R-squared 0.0214 0.0220 0.0222 0.0222 0.0222 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions of buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The 
dependent variable, BHAR, is the buy-and-hold abnormal return over 12 months, computed as the difference 
between the buy-and-hold return of firm i from January to December of year y and the buy-and-hold return of the 
value-weighted market portfolio over the same period. We use standard errors that control for clustering at the firm 
level. Policy risk = the total number of bills introduced by the home-state senators and house representatives over 
the year y. Number of politically connected board members = the number of board members who are politically 
connected. Board’s political freshness = board’s political freshness based on directors’ elapse period. We add one 
and take the natural log for Board’s political freshness in the regressions. Size = the natural log of one plus market 
value of common equity. Beta = beta, computed using weekly returns. Past return = previous stock return in year y-
1. We include the eleven industry dummies, which are modified based on the Fama-French 10-industry 
classification. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics computed using standard errors after clustering at the firm 
level. Refer to the appendix for detailed variable descriptions. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Now we turn our analysis to political connections built through PACs donations or 
lobbying activity. Recently, the literature has provided strong evidence that firms benefit from 
political contributions (Cooper et al., 2010; Knight, 2006; Shon, 2006; Jayachandran, 2006). 
Cooper et al. (2010) find that corporate contributions to political campaigns are positively and 
significantly correlated with the firms’ future returns. Moreover, this effect is stronger when 
firms support more candidates who hold their office in the same state that the firm is based. In 
this sub-section, we test the effects of corporate political strategies through corporate 
contributions to U.S. political campaigns. Following Cooper et al. (2010), we construct four 
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measures of corporate political contributions: 1) Number of supported candidates, 2) strength of 
relationships with supported candidates, 3) supported candidates’ ability, and 4) supported 
candidates’ power. These proxies are useful to examine whether corporate political strategies are 
more effective when the board is politically connected. As in the previous analysis, we include 
contribution variables, policy risk, and their interactions. 
The cross-sectional regressions results shown in Table 13 paint a picture similar to that in 
Table 12. The coefficients of the interactions between the corporate political contributions 
variables and policy risk are significantly negative (see columns [V] to [VIII]), indicating that the 
policy risk effect is significantly less for firms that contribute money to politicians’ election 
campaigns. Furthermore, the interacted variables between policy risk and candidates’ 
characteristic variables describe that the political connection’s hedging effects are efficient when 
firms donate more to powerful politicians’ PACs. Overall, the results presented in Table 13 
suggest that corporate political strategy through monetary donations to politicians is an effective 
hedging tool that can mitigate policy risk. Table 14 present results of the cross-sectional 
regression that includes lobbying expenditures as the measure of corporate political strategy. 
While the earlier corporate political strategy literature primarily focuses on corporate PACs, 
there are some recent studies on corporate lobbying activity. Hill et al. (2011) find that lobbying 
firms significantly outperform non-lobbying firms after controlling for other factors known to 
influence firm value. Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2010) document that lobbying firms do better 
than non-lobbying firms in terms of operating performance.  
A key distinction between PAC donations and lobbying is that PACs have an upper limit 
of donation per candidate and per election cycle23, but lobbying does not. A firm, on average, 
                                                 
23 The maximum amount that a firm contributes is limited by the Federal law; $5,000 per candidate per 
election, $15,000 per political party per year (http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacfaq.php). 
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contributes less than $35,000 per year (Cooper et al., 2010) toward PACs, but spends around 1.3 
million per year for lobbying (Hill et al., 2011). Thus, given the large difference in amounts, one 
may argue that lobbying is more of a primary tool in implementing corporate political strategy. 
Moreover, Drutman (2011) notes unaccountable tremendous growth in lobbying business.  The 
number of lobbying organizations increased by twofold over the last three decades (from 7,000 
to 14,000) and lobbying expenditure was about $200 million in 1983, but is $3.47 billion in 2009 
which is close to seven times greater than value in 1983 after controlling inflation. Consistent 
with previous results, lobbying expenditures are positively associated with BHARs. Motivated by 
the emergence and importance of lobbying activity, we also test whether lobbying is an effective 
tool to mitigate a policy risk. As expected, we find that lobbying effectively reduces policy risk. 
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Table 13 Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns 
Dependent variable = BHAR [I] [II] [III] [IV] [V] [VI] [VII] [VIII] 
Policy risk 0.0332*** 0.0334*** 0.0329*** 0.0327*** 0.0365*** 0.0365*** 0.0356*** 0.0345*** 
 (12.04) (12.11) (11.99) (11.91) (12.22) (12.20) (12.17) (11.93) 
Number of supported candidates 0.0151***    0.0526***    
 (9.10)    (7.55)    
Strength of relationships with supported candidates  0.0086***    0.0277***   
  (9.46)    (7.23)   
Supported candidates’ ability   0.0229***    0.0758***  
   (10.60)    (7.76)  
Supported candidates’ power    0.0228***    0.0730*** 
    (7.79)    (5.78) 
Policy risk * Number of supported candidates     -0.0080***    
     (-5.59)    
Policy risk * Strength of relationships with supported candidates      -0.0041***   
      (-5.14)   
Policy risk * Supported candidates’ ability       -0.0113***  
       (-5.70)  
Policy risk * Supported candidates’ power        -0.0108*** 
        (-4.15) 
Size -0.0104*** -0.0105*** -0.0100*** -0.0090*** -0.0102*** -0.0102*** -0.0098*** -0.0088*** 
 (-6.82) (-6.91) (-6.81) (-6.08) (-6.68) (-6.73) (-6.66) (-5.92) 
B/M 0.1179*** 0.1179*** 0.1184*** 0.1189*** 0.1180*** 0.1180*** 0.1185*** 0.1190*** 
 (18.40) (18.41) (18.52) (18.55) (18.42) (18.44) (18.53) (18.57) 
Beta -0.0172*** -0.0172*** -0.0172*** -0.0175*** -0.0177*** -0.0177*** -0.0176*** -0.0178*** 
 (-4.99) (-5.00) (-4.99) (-5.08) (-5.12) (-5.13) (-5.11) (-5.17) 
Past return -0.0156*** -0.0156*** -0.0157*** -0.0160*** -0.0155*** -0.0156*** -0.0156*** -0.0160*** 
 (-3.51) (-3.52) (-3.52) (-3.61) (-3.50) (-3.51) (-3.52) (-3.60) 
Constant -0.0577* -0.0583* -0.0640* -0.0813** -0.0780** -0.0783** -0.0810** -0.0942*** 
 (-1.73) (-1.76) (-1.95) (-2.47) (-2.29) (-2.31) (-2.43) (-2.81) 
         
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
N. of observations 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 
R-squared 0.0221 0.0221 0.0221 0.0218 0.0223 0.0223 0.0223 0.0219 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions of buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The dependent variable, BHAR, is the 
buy-and-hold abnormal return over 12 months, computed as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of firm i from January to December of year 
y and the buy-and-hold return of the value-weighted market portfolio over the same period. We use standard errors that control for clustering at the firm 
level. Policy risk = the total number of bills introduced by the home-state senators and house representatives over the year y. Number of politically 
connected board members = the number of board members who are politically connected. Board’s political freshness = board’s political freshness based 
on directors’ elapse period. We add one and take the natural log for Board’s political freshness in the regressions. Size = the natural log of one plus 
market value of common equity. Beta = beta, computed using weekly returns. Past return = previous stock return in year y-1. We include the eleven 
industry dummies, which are modified based on the Fama-French 10-industry classification. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics computed using 
standard errors after clustering at the firm level. Refer to the appendix for detailed variable descriptions. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 
5% levels, respectively. 
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 Although it is hard to compare the dollar to dollar effect of PAC donations with that of 
lobbying expenditures on policy risk, our evidence suggests that lobbying dollars are worth 
spending. An increase in one standard deviation of lobbying expenditure (i.e., $817,900) leads to 
a 5.72% (=-0.0042*ln($817,900)) decrease in policy risk’s effect on returns. To conclude, 
lobbying is also an effective corporate political strategy in terms of reducing policy risk. 
Table 14 Political Lobbying Activities and Stock Returns 
Dependent variable = BHAR [I] [II] 
Policy risk 0.0422*** 0.0502*** 
 (12.78) (13.47) 
Lobbying expenditures 0.0062*** 0.0265*** 
 (9.36) (9.12) 
Policy risk * Lobbying expenditures  -0.0042*** 
  (-7.13) 
Size -0.0184*** -0.0181*** 
 (-10.00) (-9.83) 
B/M 0.1198*** 0.1196*** 
 (15.63) (15.62) 
Beta -0.0246*** -0.0256*** 
 (-5.36) (-5.56) 
Past return -0.0271*** -0.0271*** 
 (-5.20) (-5.19) 
Constant 0.0817** 0.0364 
 (1.96) (0.86) 
   
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
   
N. of observations 50,773 50,773 
R-squared 0.0301 0.0307 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions of buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The 
dependent variable, BHAR, is the buy-and-hold abnormal return over 12 months, computed as the difference 
between the buy-and-hold return of firm i from January to December of year y and the buy-and-hold return of the 
value-weighted market portfolio over the same period. We use standard errors that control for clustering at the firm 
level. Policy risk = the total number of bills introduced by the home-state senators and house representatives over the 
year y. Lobbying expenditures = corporate total lobbying expenditures. We add one and take the natural log for 
Lobbying expenditures in the regressions. Size = the natural log of one plus market value of common equity. Beta = 
beta, computed using weekly returns. Past return = previous stock return in year y-1. We include the eleven industry 
dummies, which are modified based on the Fama-French 10-industry classification. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics 
computed using standard errors after clustering at the firm level. Refer to the appendix for detailed variable descriptions. *** 
and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
Next, we investigate the aggregate effect of all three types of corporate political strategies 
as hedging tools against policy risk. Because in practice some firms implement a number of the 
three types of corporate political strategies together, the effect of the overall political strategy 
cannot be properly identified when we examine individual strategies in isolation. Therefore, in 
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order to examine the effectiveness of firms’ combined political strategies, we develop the 
political strategy index (or PSI) that combines the yearly ranks of Number of politically 
connected board members, Number of supported candidates, and Lobbying expenditures. We 
report the detailed definition of PSI in Appendix A. Results of the BHAR model as a function of 
policy risk, PSI and their interaction are shown in Table 15. We find that the coefficient of the 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. This result confirms our 
previous results and indicates that the combination of the three corporate political strategies also 
acts as an effective mechanism that mitigates policy risk. 
Table 15 Political Strategy Index and Stock Returns 
Dependent variable = BHAR [I] [II] 
Policy risk 0.0324*** 0.0587*** 
 (11.82) (8.24) 
PSI 0.0372*** 0.2862*** 
 (3.36) (4.84) 
Policy risk * PSI  -0.0519*** 
  (-4.14) 
Size -0.0068*** -0.0068*** 
 (-5.00) (-5.01) 
B/M 0.1204*** 0.1204*** 
 (18.84) (18.84) 
Beta -0.0182*** -0.0185*** 
 (-5.32) (-5.40) 
Past return -0.0165*** -0.0164*** 
 (-3.72) (-3.70) 
Constant -0.1367*** -0.2633*** 
 (-4.50) (-6.00) 
   
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
   
N. of observations 71,269 71,269 
R-squared 0.0216 0.0218 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions of buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The 
dependent variable, BHAR, is the buy-and-hold abnormal return over 12 months, computed as the difference 
between the buy-and-hold return of firm i from January to December of year y and the buy-and-hold return of the 
value-weighted market portfolio over the same period. We use standard errors that control for clustering at the firm 
level. Policy risk = the total number of bills introduced by the home-state senators and house representatives over 
the year y. PSI = the political strategy index that combines the yearly ranks of Number of politically connected board 
members, Number of supported candidates, and Lobbying expenditures. Number of politically connected board 
members = the number of board members who are politically connected. Number of supported candidates = the 
number of supported candidates. Lobbying expenditures = corporate total lobbying expenditures. Size = the natural 
log of one plus market value of common equity. Beta = beta, computed using weekly returns. Past return = previous 
stock return in year y-1. We include the eleven industry dummies, which are modified based on the Fama-French 10-
industry classification. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics computed using standard errors after clustering at the 
firm level. Refer to the appendix for detailed variable descriptions. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 
5% levels, respectively. 
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Political connections and procurement contracts  
 The second potential channel of value creation through corporate political strategies is the 
attainment of government business contracts.24 Goldman et al. (2010) show that firms connected 
to the party in power are more likely to obtain profitable government contracts given the 
administration. Following Goldman et al.’s (2010), we look at the relation between political 
connections and procurement contracts. In contrast to their work, our evidence is based on a 
much larger dataset that includes a longer time period. In addition, whereas Goldman et al. 
(2010) only consider one type of political connection (i.e., the one provided by ex-politicians on 
corporate boards), our investigation has a much wider scope and includes all three types of 
political strategies. The results of our investigation of the relationship between type of political 
strategy and the total dollar amount of procurement contacts in a calendar year are shown in 
Table 16. 
Our empirical results suggest that all types of political connections variables are 
positively associated with the value of procurement contracts that a firm secures in a given year. 
The coefficients are sizeable indicating that the effect is non-trivial in an economic sense, and 
also highly statistically significant. For instance, an increase by one standard deviation of 
number of supported candidates via PAC contribution leads to increase value of procurement 
contracts to obtain by $10.56 million. Consistent with Goldman et al.’s (2010) findings, we show 
that being politically connected is financially rewarded, in that political connections give firms 
the opportunity to acquire lucrative government procurement contracts. 
 
                                                 
24 Several past studies have advanced the notion that political connections can lead to preferential treatment 
of firms by governments. For example, Sapienza (2004) finds that state-owned banks lend money to politically 
connected firms with lower interest rates than non-connected peers. Faccio et al. (2006) document that, in an 
international setting, politically connected firms are given priority when government aid funds are allocated. This is 
consistent with Duchin and Sosyura’s findings (2011) in the United States. 
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Table 16 Corporate Political Strategies and Procurement Contracts 
Dependent variable = Procurement amount [I] [II] [III] [IV] [V] [VI] [VII] [VIII] 
Number of politically connected board members 1.1328***        
 (8.03)        
Board’s political freshness  0.4489***       
  (7.09)       
Number of supported candidates   0.6273***      
   (10.57)      
Strength of relationships with supported candidates    0.3410***     
    (10.56)     
Supported candidates’ ability     0.7275***    
     (8.78)    
Supported candidates’ power      1.1203***   
      (10.40)   
Lobbying expenditures       0.2690***  
       (16.06)  
PSI        1.7149*** 
        (9.69) 
Size 1.1043*** 1.1120*** 0.9891*** 0.9987*** 1.0480*** 1.0245*** 0.9254*** 1.1346*** 
 (34.60) (35.14) (30.00) (30.46) (32.33) (32.14) (25.44) (36.75) 
B/M 0.7064*** 0.7281*** 0.6234*** 0.6310*** 0.6704*** 0.6454*** 0.6080*** 0.7224*** 
 (9.45) (9.72) (8.25) (8.37) (8.89) (8.57) (7.11) (9.60) 
Beta -0.2458*** -0.2461*** -0.2032*** -0.2065*** -0.2170*** -0.2106*** -0.2896*** -0.2496*** 
 (-6.34) (-6.35) (-5.31) (-5.40) (-5.65) (-5.49) (-5.50) (-6.43) 
Past return -0.1844*** -0.1772*** -0.1615*** -0.1657*** -0.1738*** -0.1715*** -0.2138*** -0.1965*** 
 (-5.85) (-5.58) (-5.14) (-5.27) (-5.52) (-5.47) (-5.89) (-6.24) 
Constant -17.5687*** -17.7927*** -15.4124*** -15.5827*** -16.4776*** -16.0434*** -14.1717*** -18.8457*** 
 (-27.69) (-28.29) (-23.73) (-24.09) (-25.68) (-25.38) (-19.10) (-30.10) 
         
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
N. of observations 71,269 68,985 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 50,773 71,269 
R-squared 0.1872 0.1835 0.1926 0.1923 0.1884 0.1908 0.2097 0.1842 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions of procurement contracts. The dependent variable, Procurement amount, is 
the total amount of procurement contracts made with the U.S. government given a year y, and the amount is transformed by adding one and taking the 
natural log. We use standard errors that control for clustering at the firm level. PSI = political strategy index. Number of politically connected board 
members = the number of board members who are politically connected. Board’s political freshness = board’s political freshness based on directors’ 
elapse period. Number of supported candidates = the number of supported candidates. Strength of relationships with supported candidates = the strength 
of the relationships between candidates and the contributing firm. Supported candidates’ ability = the ability of the candidates to help the firm. 
Supported candidates’ power = the power of the candidates. Corporate lobbying expenditures = corporate total lobbying expenditures. We add one and 
take the natural log for Board’s political freshness, Number of supported candidates, Strength of relationships with supported candidates, Supported 
candidates’ ability, Supported candidates’ power, and Lobbying expenditures in the regressions. Size = the natural log of one plus market value of 
common equity. Beta = beta, computed using weekly returns. Past return = previous stock return in year y-1. We include the eleven industry dummies, 
which are modified based on the Fama-French 10-industry classification. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics computed using standard errors after 
clustering at the firm level. Refer to the appendix for detailed variable descriptions. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.   
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Political connections and the likelihood of lawsuit  
 The third channel through which political connections can become value-relevant for 
firms is their potential contribution to firms’ implication in lawsuits. Politically connected firms 
are more likely to pursue extra benefits through borderline illegal activities25 in the belief that 
their political connections will provide them with adequate protection in the case of lawsuits. For 
example, Firth et al. (2011) document that Chinese state-owned firms (i.e., de-facto politically 
connected firms) are more likely to be sued than other firms. State-owned firms, however, are 
more likely to enter an appeal process which very often ends in their favor.  
 Panel A of Table 17 reports outcomes of the probit model that investigates the relation 
between political connections and the probability of lawsuit. We estimate eight different 
regressions corresponding to eight different measures of the three types corporate political 
strategies introduced earlier. The coefficients of the political connections variables are positive 
and highly significant across all eight models, indicating that stronger political connections are 
associated with greater likelihood of litigation. This evidence is consistent with the notion that 
connectedness leads firms to a greater propensity to pursue gains through illegal means.26  
 Results in Panel A established a causal link between political strategies and the likelihood 
of being sued. In other words, while pursuing extra benefits, firms with political strategies 
expose themselves to greater probability of being involved in litigation cases. This demonstrates 
that there is an upside and a downside to being politically active. In Panel B, we examine how 
the market feels about firms’ political strategies upon litigation. We find that litigation is 
                                                 
25 Chaney et al. (2011) find that politically connected firms exhibit a lower quality of disclosure than non-
connected peers, since under high information asymmetric circumstance firms may enjoy greater benefits. Data 
compiled by Stanford law school mainly deals with litigation related to security fraud. Further examination reveals 
that over 90% of lawsuits are accused due to mispresentation and/or omission of the material information on the 
financial statements. Thus, our study naturally extends Chaney et al.‘s work. 
26 An alternative view of these results is that firms with illegal activities build up their political strategies in 
anticipation of having to face litigation in the future. The issue of causality needs to be further addressed. 
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negatively associated with BHAR at a 1 % significant level throughout eight different 
regressions. In a calendar year when firms face litigation, a firm’s stock market performance at 
least drops by 31.7%. To understand the role of political strategies against litigation risks, we 
interacted between litigation and eight different political strategies. In six of eight regressions, 
the coefficients of interacted terms are positive and at least significant at a 5 % level. This 
evidence could be interpreted as either that a) the negative effect of litigation is reduced by 
political connections (i.e., corporate political strategies can be a hedge against litigation risk) or 
that b) litigation leads to greater risk associated with being politically active. 
In Panel C, we, therefore, undertake an additional test to see which of the two effects 
drives a positive association between interacted terms and BHAR. To operationalize this, we 
investigate how corporate political strategies affect the settlement to resolve a pending lawsuit. 
We collect the amount of settlement and set the value to 0 if the court dismiss lawsuit without 
imposing any cost on defendants. Our results suggest that although the coefficients generally 
have the expected negative sign, corporate political strategies do not significantly reduce the 
settlement of lawsuit. In untabulated results, we also look at a relation between the probability of 
being dismissed by the court and corporate political strategies, overall evidence indicates that 
political connections do not increase the probability of being dismissed. Taken together, our 
results do not support the notion that political connections can effectively derive favorable 
outcomes with respect to litigation and settlements. Instead, these additional results reflect that 
investors may feel more uncertainty when politically active firms are under litigation. 
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Table 17 Corporate Political Strategies and Litigation 
Panel A. Political Strategies and the Likelihood of Lawsuit 
Dependent variable = Litigation [I] [II] [III] [IV] [V] [VI] [VII] [VIII] 
Number of politically connected board members 0.1216***        
 (6.40)        
Board’s political freshness  0.0567***       
  (5.59)       
Number of supported candidates   0.0235***      
   (2.74)      
Strength of relationships with supported candidates    0.0100**     
    (2.06)     
Supported candidates’ ability     0.0431***    
     (3.54)    
Supported candidates’ power      0.0540***   
      (3.29)   
Lobbying expenditures       0.0183***  
       (6.66)  
PSI        0.2058*** 
        (3.82) 
Size 0.0874*** 0.0885*** 0.0902*** 0.0926*** 0.0890*** 0.0891*** 0.0678*** 0.0922*** 
 (15.53) (15.27) (14.55) (15.09) (14.76) (14.71) (9.49) (16.50) 
B/M -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0012 
 (-0.84) (-0.50) (-0.86) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-1.27) (-0.68) (-0.84) 
Beta 0.2396*** 0.2375*** 0.2399*** 0.2392*** 0.2404*** 0.2400*** 0.2771*** 0.2391*** 
 (17.60) (17.08) (17.60) (17.54) (17.64) (16.87) (16.65) (17.55) 
Past return -0.0696*** -0.0724*** -0.0713*** -0.0723*** -0.0707*** -0.0709*** -0.0764*** -0.0723*** 
 (-4.23) (-4.29) (-4.31) (-4.37) (-4.28) (-3.21) (-3.28) (-4.38) 
Constant -4.0984*** -4.1252*** -4.1350*** -4.1776*** -4.1129*** -4.1142*** -3.6540*** -4.2713*** 
 (-33.28) (-32.66) (-31.33) (-31.86) (-31.78) (-31.21) (-24.09) (-35.78) 
         
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
N. of observations 70,965 68,685 70,965 70,965 70,965 70,965 50,562 70,965 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0769 0.0771 0.0747 0.0745 0.0751 0.0750 0.0764 0.0752 
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Table 17 (Continued) 
Panel B. Political Strategies, Litigations and Firm Performance 
Dependent variable=BHAR [I] [II] [III] [IV] [V] [VI] [VII] [VIII] 
Litigation -0.3171*** -0.3200*** -0.3303*** -0.3296*** -0.3290*** -0.3303*** -0.3242*** -0.3858*** 
 
(-19.13) (-18.23) (-19.33) (-19.22) (-19.70) (-19.85) (-16.37) (-10.64) 
Number of politically connected board members 0.0360*** 
       
 
(7.43) 
       Litigation*Number of politically connected board members 0.0123 
       
 
(0.92) 
       Board’s political freshness 
 
0.0143*** 
      
  
(6.07) 
      Litigation*Board’s political freshness 
 
0.0124 
      
  
(1.33) 
      Number of supported candidates 
  
0.0123*** 
     
   
(7.38) 
     Litigation*Number of supported candidates 
  
0.0251*** 
     
   
(4.14) 
     Strength of relationships with supported candidates 
   
0.0070*** 
    
    
(7.63) 
    Litigation*Strength of relationships with supported candidates 
   
0.0143*** 
    
    
(4.03) 
    Supported candidates’ ability 
    
0.0198*** 
   
     
(9.09) 
   Litigation*Supported candidates’ ability 
    
0.0365*** 
   
     
(4.60) 
   Supported candidates’ power 
     
0.0185*** 
  
      
(6.27) 
  Litigation*Supported candidates’ power 
     
0.0526*** 
  
      
(4.96) 
  Lobbying expenditures 
      
0.0058*** 
 
       
(8.67) 
 Litigation*Lobbying expenditures 
      
0.0063*** 
 
       
(2.75) 
 PSI 
       
0.0349*** 
        
(3.11) 
Litigation*PSI 
       
0.1351** 
        
(2.44) 
Size -0.0055*** -0.0052*** -0.0071*** -0.0070*** -0.0069*** -0.0059*** -0.0156*** -0.0041*** 
 
(-3.99) (-3.70) (-4.64) (-4.66) (-4.70) (-3.99) (-8.51) (-2.99) 
B/M 0.1235*** 0.1240*** 0.1223*** 0.1223*** 0.1226*** 0.1230*** 0.1250*** 0.1244*** 
 
(19.27) (19.01) (19.06) (19.07) (19.14) (19.18) (16.31) (19.44) 
Beta -0.0125*** -0.0124*** -0.0116*** -0.0116*** -0.0116*** -0.0119*** -0.0155*** -0.0127*** 
 
(-3.64) (-3.57) (-3.37) (-3.39) (-3.36) (-3.46) (-3.38) (-3.70) 
Past return -0.0200*** -0.0200*** -0.0198*** -0.0198*** -0.0197*** -0.0201*** -0.0320*** -0.0204*** 
 
(-4.49) (-4.42) (-4.43) (-4.44) (-4.43) (-4.50) (-6.11) (-4.58) 
Constant 0.0512* 0.0451 0.0819*** 0.0809*** 0.0790*** 0.0610** 0.2515*** 0.0112 
 
(1.80) (1.55) (2.64) (2.64) (2.63) (2.01) (6.68) (0.41) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of observations 71,269 68,985 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 50,773 71,269 
R-squared 0.0250 0.0249 0.0250 0.0250 0.0251 0.0248 0.0324 0.0245 
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Table 17 (Continued) 
Panel C. Political Strategies and Settlement Amount 
Dependent variable: Settlement amount [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
                  
Number of politically connected board members -0.5075* 
       
 
(-1.79) 
       Board’s political freshness 
 
-0.0782 
      
  
(-0.40) 
      Number of supported candidates 
  
-0.1760 
     
   
(-1.07) 
     Strength of relationships with supported candidates 
   
-0.0822 
    
    
(-0.86) 
    Supported candidates’ ability 
    
-0.2495 
   
     
(-1.09) 
   Supported candidates’ power 
     
-0.3902 
  
      
(-1.25) 
  Lobbying expenditures 
      
-0.0404 
 
       
(-0.92) 
 PSI 
       
-0.7016 
        
(-0.71) 
Size 0.0345 0.0034 0.0441 0.0231 0.0353 0.0553 0.0336 -0.0132 
 
(0.28) (0.03) (0.32) (0.17) (0.27) (0.41) (0.25) (-0.11) 
B/M -0.0660 -0.0747 -0.0672 -0.0790 -0.0758 -0.0613 -0.0447 -0.1020 
 
(-0.17) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.20) (-0.16) (-0.11) (-0.27) 
Beta -0.7487*** -0.7564*** -0.7543*** -0.7473*** -0.7511*** -0.7536*** -0.8452*** -0.7297*** 
 
(-3.14) (-3.09) (-3.16) (-3.13) (-3.15) (-3.16) (-3.30) (-3.06) 
Past return 0.7693*** 0.7141*** 0.7643*** 0.7685*** 0.7626*** 0.7600*** 0.8111*** 0.7700*** 
 
(3.13) (2.85) (3.12) (3.14) (3.12) (3.11) (3.10) (3.14) 
Constant 6.2638** 7.1927*** 6.0433** 6.4410** 6.2030** 5.8220** 5.8658** 7.4451*** 
 
(2.36) (2.66) (2.08) (2.25) (2.20) (2.04) (2.03) (2.95) 
         Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         N. of observations 1,498 1,408 1,498 1,498 1,498 1,498 1,345 1,498 
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.025 
This table provides results of investigation a relation between a firm’s political strategies and the likelihood of litigation, the role of political strategies 
upon litigation, and its consequence. Panel A reports the estimated coefficients of the probit model where the dependent variable, Litigation, is the 
indicator that takes a value of 1 if the firm is litigated and a value of 0 otherwise. Panel B reports the estimated coefficients of the OLS regressions 
where dependent variable is BHAR. In addition to the independent variables in Panel A, interacted terms between a various aspect of political strategies 
and litigation are included. Panel C reports the estimated coefficients of the OLS regressions where the dependent variable is amounts of settlement for 
litigation and log-transformed after adding 1. We include the eleven industry dummies, which are modified based on the Fama-French 10-industry 
classification. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics computed using standard errors after clustering at the firm level. Refer to the appendix for detailed 
variable descriptions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Are the different corporate political strategies substitutes or complements? 
 We now turn our attention to the important question of whether the three types of 
corporate political strategies are complements or substitutes. We test this in two ways. First, we 
directly examine whether the firm present more or less use of one particular strategy depending 
on two other alternative ways of strategies. If the three strategies are complements, we should 
observe greater use of a particular strategy if another strategy is in place as well. In contrast, if 
they are substitutes we should observe that the intensity of using a particular strategy should 
increase in the absence of another strategy.  
Second, we also test complementary or substitute effects by examining the effects of 
three political strategy variables on abnormal returns. In the case of the complementarity, we 
should observe the coefficients of a particular strategy variable increase in absolute terms if 
another strategy is in place as well, whereas we should observe a decrease of the coefficient in 
absolute terms if the valuation effects of the two strategies are substitute effects. 
 We explore the issue of complementarity vs. substitutability in Table 18. The table 
contains three panels, one for each political strategy. Panel A focuses on politicians on boards, 
Panel B on PAC contributions, and Panel C on lobbying expenditures. The first row of each 
panel contains the mean value of the political connection variable for different subsamples of 
firms formed based on whether the other two corporate political strategies are in place or not. 
The remaining three rows of each panel contain the coefficients of a) the interaction term 
between political connection and policy risk in the BHAR model (as in the model tested in Table 
12, 13, or 14, b) the political connection variable in the procurement contracts model (as in Table 
16), and c) the political connection variable in the litigation probit model (as in Table 17). The 
three aforementioned models are estimated separately for the different subsamples of firms with 
and without the other two political strategies.  
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The results on the first rows of three panels indicate that the average values of political 
variables are generally always higher in the subsamples for firms that have also another of the 
other two corporate political strategies in place. Thus, the mean difference test results are 
consistent with the notion that there is complementarity in terms of the use of the three 
alternative political strategies. However, when we examine the relationships among three 
political variables based on their effects on abnormal returns, we fail to find consistent patterns. 
The differences in the estimated coefficients between different subsamples do not reveal a clear 
picture and are not significant in many cases. Therefore, only mean comparisons support the 
complementary relationships among the variables.  
Endogeneity issue and sample selection correction 
Our main findings documented in this paper earlier may be attributed either to 
endogeneity problem or sample selection bias. For instance, Agrawal and Knoeber (2002) argue 
that firms engaging in more business with the government tend to appoint politically connected 
directors. In a similar vein, firms exposed to higher litigation risks may demand political 
connections to induce favorable outcomes of litigations. In Panel A of Table 19, we account for 
potential endogeneity issue by employing two-stage least square (or 2SLS) model. An instrument 
variable that we use is a number of congressional districts in a corporate headquarters’ state.   
Hence, a number of congressional districts is significantly associated with a firm’ 
political connectedness, but not associated with a firm’s ability to diversify policy risks, secure 
procurement contracts, and the probability of facing litigation. A number of congressional 
districts could be either positively or negatively related to the level of political connectedness. If 
home state has more districts, firms may have a greater pool of politicians that lead to more 
political activities (PAC or lobbying). In this case, we expect a positive link between a number of 
congressional districts and political connectedness. 
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Table 18 Different Political Strategies: Substitutes vs. Complements 
Panel A: Focus on politically connected board members 
 PAC donation: No PAC donation: Yes Differences 
 [I] 
Lobbying: 
No 
[II] 
Lobbying: 
Yes 
[III] 
Lobbying: 
No 
[IV] 
Lobbying: 
Yes 
Lobbying matters? PAC donation matters? 
[I] – [II] [III] – [IV] [I] – [III] [II] – [IV] 
Mean Number of politically connected 
board members 
0.0934 0.3223 0.2760 0.6322 -0.2289*** 
(-21.07) 
-0.3562*** 
(-16.79) 
-0.1826 
(-12.66) 
-0.3099*** 
(-16.33) 
Coefficient of 
Number of 
politically 
connected 
board members 
in 
Policy risk hedging 
model (Table 3) 
0.0375*** 
(4.11) 
0.0307** 
(2.17) 
0.0084 
(0.50) 
0.0122 
(1.63) 
0.0068 
(0.39) 
-0.0038 
(-0.20) 
0.0290 
(1.50) 
0.0184 
(1.15) 
Procurement model 
(Table 7) 
0.5308*** 
(2.88) 
0.7975** 
(2.23) 
0.6529 
(1.13) 
0.7039*** 
(3.25) 
-0.2667 
(-0.70) 
-0.0509 
(-0.08) 
-0.1221 
(-0.21) 
0.0937 
(0.23) 
Litigation model 
(Table 8) 
0.0915*** 
(2.59) 
0.0335 
(0.64) 
0.2468*** 
(2.84) 
0.0967*** 
(2.90) 
0.0580 
(0.92) 
0.1501 
(1.61) 
-0.1553* 
(-1.66) 
-0.0632 
(-1.02) 
Panel B: Focus on PAC donations 
 Politician on board: No Politician on board: Yes Differences 
 [I] 
Lobbying: 
No 
[II] 
Lobbying: 
Yes 
[III] 
Lobbying: 
No 
[IV] 
Lobbying: 
Yes 
Lobbying matters? Politician on board matters? 
[I] – [II] [III] – [IV] [I] – [III] [II] – [IV] 
Mean Number of supported candidates 
1.1478 32.2596 5.2674 93.1555 
-31.1118*** 
(-35.28) 
-87.8882*** 
(-36.16) 
-4.1196*** 
(-9.19) 
-60.8960*** 
(-23.92) 
Coefficient of 
Number of 
supported 
candidates in 
Policy risk hedging 
model (Table 4) 
0.0204*** 
(4.49) 
0.0114*** 
(2.99) 
0.0079 
(1.04) 
0.0113** 
(2.36) 
0.0090 
(1.52) 
-0.0034 
(-0.37) 
0.0124 
(1.40) 
0.00003 
(0.005) 
Procurement model 
(Table 7) 
0.1700 
(1.51) 
0.3490*** 
(3.25) 
0.0726 
(0.32) 
0.2974* 
(1.95) 
-0.1790 
(-1.21) 
-0.2248 
(-0.86) 
0.0974 
(0.41) 
0.0516 
(0.29) 
Litigation model 
(Table 8) 
0.0083 
(0.32) 
-0.0165 
(-0.89) 
0.0472 
(1.38) 
0.0033 
(0.16) 
0.0248 
(0.77) 
0.0438 
(1.09) 
-0.0389 
(-0.90) 
-0.0198 
(-0.70) 
Panel C: Focus on lobbying expenditures 
 Politician on board: No Politician on board: Yes Differences 
 
[I]  
PAC donation: 
No 
[II] 
PAC donation: 
Yes 
[III]  
PAC donation: 
No 
[IV] 
PAC donation: 
Yes 
PAC donation matters? Politician on board matters? 
[I] – [II] [III] – [IV] [I] – [III] [II] – [IV] 
Mean Lobbying expenditures 0.0161 0.4785 0.1080 1.6742 -0.4623*** 
(-23.12) 
-1.5663*** 
(-22.49) 
-0.0918*** 
(-7.91) 
-1.1958*** 
(-16.72) 
Coefficient of 
Lobbying 
expenditures in 
Policy risk 
hedging model 
(Table 5) 
0.0045*** 
(4.02) 
0.0041*** 
(2.96) 
0.0054*** 
(2.78) 
0.0061 
(0.55) 
0.0003 
(0.19) 
0.0014 
(0.51) 
-0.0009 
(-0.41) 
0.0002 
(0.07) 
Procurement 
model (Table 7) 
0.2333*** 
(10.72) 
0.2378*** 
(6.29) 
0.2244*** 
(4.99) 
0.2340*** 
(4.08) 
-0.0044 
(-0.10) 
-0.0097 
(-0.14) 
0.0090 
(0.19) 
0.0037 
(0.06) 
Litigation model 
(Table 8) 
0.0176*** 
(4.40) 
0.0226*** 
(2.76) 
0.0170** 
(2.45) 
0.0035 
(0.35) 
-0.0050 
(-0.55) 
0.0136 
(1.13) 
0.0006 
(0.07) 
0.0192 
(1.50) 
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Table 18 (Continued) 
This table provides results of investigation a relation between a firm’s political strategies and the likelihood of litigation, the role of political strategies 
upon litigation, and its consequence. Panel A reports the estimated coefficients of the probit model where the dependent variable, Litigation, is the 
indicator that takes a value of 1 if the firm is litigated and a value of 0 otherwise. PSI = political strategy index. Number of politically connected board 
members = the number of board members who are politically connected. Board’s political freshness = board’s political freshness based on directors’ 
elapse period. Number of supported candidates = the number of supported candidates. Strength of relationships with supported candidates = the strength 
of the relationships between candidates and the contributing firm. Supported candidates’ ability = the ability of the candidates to help the firm. 
Supported candidates’ power = the power of the candidates. Corporate lobbying expenditures = corporate total lobbying expenditures. We add one and 
take the natural log for Board’s political freshness, Number of supported candidates, Strength of relationships with supported candidates, Supported 
candidates’ ability, Supported candidates’ power, and Lobbying expenditures in the regressions. Size = the natural log of one plus market value of 
common equity. Beta = beta, computed using weekly returns. Past return = previous stock return in year y-1. Panel B reports the estimated coefficients 
of the OLS regressions where dependent variable is BHAR. In addition to the independent variables in Panel A, interacted terms between a various 
aspect of political strategies and litigation are included. Panel C reports the estimated coefficients of the OLS regressions where the dependent variable 
is amounts of settlement for litigation and log-transformed after adding 1. We include the eleven industry dummies, which are modified based on the 
Fama-French 10-industry classification. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics computed using standard errors after clustering at the firm level. Refer to 
the appendix for detailed variable descriptions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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If home state has more districts, however, it may discourage firms to search for political 
connections due to the high entrance costs (i.e., if firms want to build political connections, they 
need to make a larger number of local politicians happy and thus incur higher costs). Our result 
supports the latter. As a dependent variable, we use a dummy, ‘connected’, that equals 1 if a firm 
has a politically connected director or engages in PAC or lobbying in a calendar year and 
otherwise 0. From the first stage regression, we save the predicted value of ‘connected’, and 
include it in the second stage regressions. Overall, our results are robust after controlling 
endogeneity problems.    
          Table 19 Endogeneity and Sample Bias Correction 
Panel A. Endogeneity Issue  
 1st stage 2nd stage 
 [I] [II] [III] [IV] [V] 
Dependent variable = Connected BHAR 
Procurement 
amount 
litigation BHAR 
N. of congressional districts -0.0128***     
 (-7.08)     
Policy Risk  0.0583***    
  (13.11)    
Pred_connected  0.7729*** 9.0201*** 10.5053*** 0.2574*** 
  (12.65) (12.48) (24.42) (7.33) 
Pred_connected * Policy Risk  -0.0875***    
  (-8.50)    
Litigation     -0.3620*** 
     (-12.32) 
Pred_connected*litigation     0.1337** 
     (2.60) 
Size 0.7109*** -0.0408*** 0.2833*** -0.6554*** -0.0290*** 
 (42.63) (-9.33) (4.26) (-17.69) (-6.87) 
B/M 0.4380*** 0.1007*** 0.2436*** -0.0023** 0.1102*** 
 (8.44) (14.71) (2.93) (-2.38) (16.16) 
Beta -0.0107 -0.0162*** -0.1645*** 0.4995*** -0.0100*** 
 (-0.48) (-4.66) (-4.39) (15.23) (-2.88) 
Past return -0.1708*** -0.0066 0.0223 0.0777 -0.0140*** 
 (-8.56) (-1.46) (0.65) (1.35) (-3.11) 
Constant -15.2966*** 0.3883*** -5.0245*** 5.2846*** 0.4568*** 
 (-43.96) (5.03) (-4.33) (8.61) (6.05) 
      
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N. of observations 71,269 71,269 71,269 70,961 71,269 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.2505 0.0237 0.1918 0.1322 0.0332 
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Table 19 (Continued) 
Panel B. Sample Selection Correction 
 [I] [II] [III] [IV] 
Dependent variable = BHAR 
Procurement 
amount 
litigation BHAR 
Policy Risk 0.0480***     
 (6.53)    
PSI 0.1638***  1.4820***  0.1338*** 0.0283**  
 (2.75) (8.24) (2.33) (2.50)  
PSI* Policy Risk -0.0252**     
 (-2.01)    
Litigation    -0.3761***  
    (-10.41)  
PSI*litigation    0.1104**  
    (2.01)  
Size -0.0177**  1.6180***  -0.2318*** 0.0347***  
 (-2.48) (10.29) (-13.57) (5.75)  
B/M 0.1139***  1.0118***  -0.0015** 0.1472***  
 (14.87) (8.74) (-2.19) (20.31)  
Beta -0.0183***  -0.2608***  0.2089*** -0.0135***  
 (-5.33) (-6.67) (13.60) (-3.95)  
Past return -0.0136***  -0.3123***  0.0135 -0.0299***  
 (-2.79) (-6.29) (0.55) (-6.26)  
Inverse Mills -0.0363  1.6107***  -1.404*** 0.1301***  
 (-1.46) (3.23) (-20.28) (6.18) 
Intercept 0.1012  -32.2241***  4.0111***  -0.9392***  
 (0.59) (-8.47) (9.52) (-6.33) 
     
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N. of observations 71,269  71,269  70,961  71,269  
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0217  0.1845  0.1240  0.0332  
We examine whether alternative corporate political strategies (i.e., politically connected board members, PAC 
donations, and lobbying expenditures) are substitutive or complementary. We construct the sub-samples with a 
particular strategy in the presence and absence of other two strategies. This table reports the mean comparisons of 
political strategy variables and the estimated coefficients of political strategy variables reported in Tables 3 
(alternatively 4 or 5), 7, and 8 for the constructed sub-samples. Number of politically connected board members = 
the number of board members who are politically connected. Number of supported candidates = the number of 
supported candidates. Lobbying expenditures = corporate total lobbying expenditures. Refer to the corresponding 
tables for information on the regressions and the appendix for detailed variable descriptions. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
In Panel B, we control for sample selection bias. During our sample period, only 22.5% 
of firms are politically connected via either a director or PAC/lobbying and perhaps those firms 
do not randomly select to be connected. In this case, our main findings using biased standard 
errors could be spurious. To calculate the inverse of the Mills Ratio, we use residuals from the 
first stage of 2 SLS in Panel A. By including inverse of the Mills Ratio in the OLS regressions, 
we control a firm’s unobservable characteristics that affect the choice of political connectedness. 
Overall, we show that corporate political strategies are beneficial as hedging tools against policy 
77 
 
risks and in securing procurement contracts, but come at the price of higher risk associated with 
litigation. 
Robustness 
In the previous tests, we estimated coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions of buy-
and-hold abnormal returns on political variables and other controls. We used standard errors that 
control for clustering at the firm level. Petersen (2009) argues that any chosen method can be 
incorrect and yield different results in many cases. Therefore, we re-examine the relationship 
using various methods to see whether our evidence persists. We replicate the model of Table 15, 
which uses the political strategy index (PSI), for our various concerns.  
First, we estimate the model without using standard errors that control for clustering. 
Second, we use standard errors that control for clustering at the state level, and year. Third, we 
use White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity correction model. Fourth, we compute buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns using the returns of matched firms. Fifth, we use the equally-weighted market 
returns in the computation of buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Sixth, we use the average of raw 
monthly returns as a dependent variable. Seventh, we use SIC 2-digit codes for industry 
dummies. Last, we use the Fama-French’s 49 industry codes for industry dummies. 
The results of these robustness checks are reported in Table 20. We find that all 
regressions show consistent patterns of coefficients on the estimates of political variables. Most 
importantly, the interaction between policy risk and political strategy index is negative and 
significant at the l% level in all models. Therefore, the results in Table 20 suggest that our 
findings are not sensitive to the methods used in estimating the model, measuring the stock 
performance, and choosing different industry classifications. 
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Table 20 Robustness Checks 
 
No 
clustering 
Clustering 
by state 
Clustering 
by year 
White 
(1980) 
PSI-
inclusive 
Equally-
weighted 
Matching 
firms 
Average 
monthly 
returns 
SIC 2 digits 
Fama-
French 49 
Industries 
 [I] [II] [III] [IV] [V] [VI] [VII] [VIII] [IX] [X] 
Policy risk 0.0587*** 0.0587*** 0.0587** 0.0587*** 0.0595*** 0.0330*** 0.0237*** 0.0051*** 0.0610*** 0.0584*** 
 (8.28) (8.48) (2.31) (8.15) (7.03) (3.04) (3.64) (9.27) (8.56) (8.23) 
PSI 0.2862*** 0.2862*** 0.2862*** 0.2862*** 0.3378*** 0.3161*** 0.1725*** 0.0218*** 0.2971*** 0.2915*** 
 (4.57) (5.65) (2.98) (4.87) (4.76) (3.56) (3.20) (4.70) (5.01) (4.92) 
Policy risk * PSI -0.0519*** -0.0519*** -0.0519*** -0.0519*** -0.0525*** -0.0503*** -0.0267** -0.0034*** -0.0541*** -0.0528*** 
 (-4.04) (-4.74) (-2.85) (-4.15) (-3.50) (-2.56) (-2.33) (-3.51) (-4.31) (-4.21) 
Size -0.0068*** -0.0068*** -0.0068 -0.0068*** -0.0084*** -0.0246*** -0.0211*** -0.0022*** -0.0072*** -0.0073*** 
 (-5.24) (-4.73) (-0.73) (-4.95) (-5.84) (-12.49) (-17.13) (-20.66) (-5.11) (-5.17) 
B/M 0.1204*** 0.1204*** 0.1204*** 0.1204*** 0.1194*** 0.0893*** 0.0180*** 0.0062*** 0.1217*** 0.1215*** 
 (26.32) (12.85) (4.66) (19.67) (18.67) (8.97) (3.29) (13.97) (18.79) (18.87) 
Beta -0.0185*** -0.0185*** -0.0185 -0.0185*** -0.0182*** -0.0124*** -0.0055* -0.0008*** -0.0161*** -0.0184*** 
 (-6.20) (-4.30) (-0.98) (-5.41) (-5.28) (-2.56) (-1.77) (-2.84) (-4.65) (-5.31) 
Past return -0.0164*** -0.0164** -0.0164 -0.0164*** -0.0160*** -0.0173*** -0.0125*** -0.0022*** -0.0172*** -0.0174*** 
 (-4.51) (-2.41) (-0.58) (-3.65) (-3.60) (-2.73) (-3.12) (-5.95) (-3.87) (-3.90) 
Constant -0.2633*** -0.2633*** -0.2633 -0.2633*** -0.2624*** 0.1935*** 0.3179*** 0.0170*** -0.2455*** -0.1994*** 
 (-6.08) (-5.05) (-1.47) (-5.99) (5.32) (3.19) (8.02) (5.04) (-3.29) (-3.14) 
           
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
N. of 
observations 
71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 71,269 
R-squared 0.0218 0.0218 0.0218 0.0218 0.0220 0.0144 0.0131 0.0281 0.0239 0.0240 
This table provides robust results after accounting for endogeniety issue and sample selection bias. Panel A. reports the estimated coefficients of the two 
stage least squares (2SLS). Model I is the first stage model of 2SLS where the dependent variable, ‘connected’, is a dummy that equals 1 if a firm has 
politically connected director, engages in PAC or lobbying given a calendar year, and otherwise 0. N. of congressional districts, instrument variable, is a 
congressional district given in a state where a firm’s headquarter is located in. From Model II to Model V, the results of the second stage models are 
reported. Pred_connected is the predicted value from the first stage regression. Panel B. reports the estimated coefficient of the sample selection 
correction. The inverse mill ratio is calculated from the first stage model of Panel A. We include the eleven industry dummies, which are modified based 
on the Fama-French 10-industry classification. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics computed using standard errors after clustering at the firm level. 
Refer to the appendix for detailed variable descriptions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Conclusions 
A fast growing literature has documented that political connections add value to firms, 
but to date there has been no other study that examine the relation based on risk implications. We 
fill this gap by investigating the multi-dimensional corporate political strategies. Our sample of 
politically connected firms includes those having ex-politicians on the board, those making PAC 
contributions, and those incurring lobbying expenditures. We study the value and risk 
implications of corporate political strategies by exploring several questions on whether 
politically connected firms effectively mitigate policy risk, b) whether they can secure 
government procurement contracts, and c) whether they are associated with a greater likelihood 
of litigation.  
We unveil that political connections through a director’s former political activity, a 
firm’s campaign donation and lobbying activity can all serve as safety devices in hedging against 
policy risks. Our asset pricing tests show that firms with high policy risk outperform those with 
low policy risk on a risk adjusted basis by about 20 basis points per month if firms’ PSIs are 
relatively low. The difference is reduced to 7 basis points per month they firms are more active in 
their political strategies. 
Political connections are also a channel for firms to receive lucrative procurement 
contracts. Finally, political connections lead firms to pursue extra benefits at the expense of 
higher litigation risks. Overall, our results reflect that investors view corporate political activities 
as effective hedging strategies against policy risk.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Panel A: Political characteristics at an individual level 
Contributor The proportion of directors who make political contributions per an election cycle. 
Contributions to 
Democratic Party 
Total contributions made to Democratic Party by a director per an election cycle. 
Contributions to 
Republican Party 
Total contributions made to Republican Party by a director per an election cycle. 
Total contributions Total contributions made by a director per an election cycle. 
Polid An individual political ideology based on Hutton et al. (2011). It is determined by the 
contribution amounts to Republican Party and Democratic Party. 
Contributions to Republican Party - Contributions to Democratic Party
Polid =
Total Contributions
. 
Democratic leaning 
director 
Director whose majority of contributions go to Democratic Party. Director
i,x,tPolid < 0, where 
Director
i,x,tPolid  is the political ideology of director x in firm i. 
Republican leaning 
director 
Director whose majority of contributions go to Republican Party Director
i,x,tPolid > 0, where 
Director
i,x,tPolid  is the political ideology of director x in firm i. 
Panel B: Political characteristics at a firm level 
Dist_dir_all Political ideology distance among directors, measured by average values of political 
ideology distance between a unique pair of directors in a given board. 
1,
1
_ _
[( 1) ( 2) 1]
A B Director Director
t i,x,t i,y,tx x y
Dist all dir Polid Polid
A B A B

 
 
      
 ,
 
where Director
i,x,tPolid  is the political ideology of director x in firm i. A and B are the numbers 
of outside directors and inside directors, respectively. 
Dist_ins_out Political ideology distance between insiders and outsiders. It is measured by the average 
value of political ideology distance between a member of the inside director group and a 
member of the outside director groups. 
, 1 1
1
_ _
A B Insider Outsider
i t i,b,t i,a,ta b
Dist ins out Polid Polid
A B  
 

  , where Insideri,b,tPolid  is the 
political ideology of inside director b in firm i. Outside
i,a,tPolid  is the political ideology of 
outside director a in firm i. A andB are the numbers of outside directors and inside 
directors, respectively. 
Dist_CEO_out 
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Dist_CEO_ins Political ideology distance between a CEO and insiders. It is measured by average value of 
political ideology distance between CEO and a member of the inside director group. 
, , , ,1
1
_ _
B CEO Insider
i t i t i b tb
Dist CEO ins Polid Polid
B 
  , where CEOi,tPolid  is the political ideology 
of CEO in firm i. Insider
i,b,tPolid  is the political ideology of inside director b in firm i. B is the 
numbers of inside directors, respectively. 
CEOPolid  The political ideology of the CEO. 
Average ( InsiderPolid ) The average of inside (employee and grey) director’s political ideology. 
Standard deviation 
( InsiderPolid ) 
The standard deviation of inside director’s political ideology. 
Average 
( OutsiderPolid ) 
The average of outside (independent) director’s political ideology. 
Standard deviation 
( OutsiderPolid ) 
The standard deviation of outside director’s political ideology. 
Directors’ total 
contributions 
An aggregate amount of directors’ contributions given a firm-year. 
Corporate PAC 
contributor 
The proportion of firms that make PAC contributions given a year. 
Corporate PAC 
contributions to 
Democratic Party 
Total PAC amount that go to Democratic Candidates given a year. 
Corporate PAC 
contributions to 
Republican Party 
Total PAC amount that go to Republican Candidates given a year. 
Corporate total 
PAC contributions  
Total amount of PAC contributions made given a year. 
PACPolid  Firm’s political ideology reflected in the corporate PAC contribution portfolio. Therefore, 
PACPolid =
Corporate PAC contributions to Republican Party - Corporate PAC contributions to Democratic Party
Corporate Total PAC contributions
 
Dist_PAC_ins Political ideology distance between firm and insiders. It is measured by average value of 
political ideology distance between PAC
i,tPolid and a member of the inside director group. 
, , , ,1
1
_ _
B PAC Insider
i t i t i b tb
Dist PAC ins Polid Polid
B 
  , where PACi,tPolid  is the firm i’s political 
ideology reflected in the corporate PAC contribution portfolio. Insider
i,b,tPolid is the political 
ideology of inside director b in firm i. B is the numbers of inside directors, respectively. 
Voter turnout  The ratio of total voters to total population in the latest Presidential election in the 
headquarter’s county. 
Voter turnout for 
Republican Party 
Voter turnout for Republican Party for the latest Presidential election in the headquarter’s 
county, which is computed by the votes for Republican Party divided by the total number of 
voters. 
Voter turnout for 
Democratic Party 
Voter turnout for Democratic Party for the latest Presidential election in the headquarter’s 
county, which is computed by the votes for Democratic Party divided by the total number of 
voters. 
Vote ratio It is measured by the ratio of voter turnout for Republican Party to voter turnout for 
Democratic Party. 
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Panel C: Controlling variables 
Assets Assets at the last day of fiscal year t [at]. 
Q Market value of assets divided by book value of assets [(prcc_f*csho + at - ceq)/at)]. 
ROA Earnings before interests and taxes divided by assets [ib/at]. 
Leverage Debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by assets [(dlc+dltt)/at]. 
FCF Free cash flow normalized by asset [(oibdp-xint-txt+chan_txditc-dvp-dvc)/at)]. 
Agency costs FCF times Poor growth; Poor growth is a dummy equals 1 if Tobin's Q is less than 1 and 
otherwise 0. 
Sales growth Sales growth [(sale t- sale t-1) / sale t-1 )-1] 
Past stock performance Cumulative abnormal returns over the market in the year leading up to the annual board 
meeting date. 
CEO duality A dummy that takes one if the CEO serves as the board chairman, and zero otherwise. 
Board size Total number of directors given a board. 
Independent board   The proportion of independent (outside) directors given a board. 
Proportion of busy 
board   
The proportion of busy directors who hold more than 3 outside directorships given a 
board. 
Contributing directors 
(annual) 
The proportion of directors who make political contributions given a board and year. 
Contributing directors 
(cumulative) 
The proportion of directors who make political contributions given a board throughout the 
sample period. 
GIM index Index for shareholders' rights (Gompers et al., 2003). 
Average (Insider’s age) The average age of inside directors. 
Standard deviation 
(Insider’s age) 
The standard deviation of inside director’ age. 
Average (Outsider’s 
age) 
The average age of outside directors. 
Standard deviation 
(Outsider’s age) 
The standard deviation of outside director’ age. 
Proportion of in-state 
directors 
The proportion of in-state directors. Directors’ home address is obtained from 
contribution filings. Home address is only available for a director who made political 
contributions. To construct this variable, we exclude directors if they don't make any 
contributions. 
Proportion of co-opted 
directors 
The proportion of outside directors who elected after a CEO is hired (Coles et al., 2011), 
which is computed by the ratio of the number of new outside directors to the total number 
of outside directors. 
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Appendix 2: Separate Tests for S&P 500 Firms and Non-S&P 500 Firms 
 Dependent variable: Qt+1 
 Pooled OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Regressions for S&P 500 firms 
Dist_all_dirt 0.150      
 
(0.441) 
  
   
Dist_ins_outt 
 
-0.050 
 
   
  
(0.766) 
 
   
Dist_CEO_outt 
  
-0.052    
   
(0.688)    
Log (1+Dist_all_dirt)    8.101   
    (0.001)***   
Log (1+Dist_ins_outt)     5.772  
     (0.001)***  
Log (1+Dist_CEO_outt)      4.761 
      (0.001)*** 
       
Controlling variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry/Year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 717 717 717 717 717 717 
Adj. R
2
 48.01% 47.97% 47.97% 48.68% 48.71% 48.79% 
Panel A: Regressions for non-S&P 500 firms 
Dist_all_dirt 0.270      
 
(0.013)** 0.318     
Dist_ins_outt  (0.001)***     
 
  0.237    
Dist_CEO_outt   (0.001)***    
       
Log (1+Dist_all_dirt)    4.225   
    (0.001)***   
Log (1+Dist_ins_outt)     2.954  
     (0.002)*** 2.255 
Log (1+Dist_CEO_outt)      (0.003)*** 
       
Controlling variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry/Year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 1,783 1,783 1,783 1,765 1,765 1,765 
Adj. R
2
 23.76% 23.96% 23.92% 23.75% 23.75% 23.71% 
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Appendix 3 Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Policy risk The total number of bills introduced by the home-state senators and house representatives over the year y. 
The data on bill information are collected from the Congressional Bills Project 
(http://www.congressionalbills.org/index.html). In the regressions, it is transformed by adding one and 
taking the natural log. 
Corporate political strategy variables 
Number of politically connected 
board members 
The number of board members who are politically connected. To be considered as politically connected, 
the board member’s party on the former political position must be same as the incumbent President’s 
party. If a firm does not have any politically connected member, a value of 0 is assigned. 
Board’s political freshness We compute political freshness for each board member by 50 – elapse period, where the elapse period is 
from the year a politically connected director left the political position to the year he/she serves as a 
corporate director. We compute the average of freshness score for each firm. To be considered as 
politically connected, the board member’s party on the former political position must be same as the 
incumbent President’s party. If a firm does not have any politically connected member, a value of 0 is 
assigned. In the regressions, it is transformed by adding one and taking the natural log. 
Number of supported candidates The number of candidates supported by the firm. The data comes from the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) summary files on political contributions to House and Senate elections. In the regressions, it is 
transformed by adding one and taking the natural log. 
Strength of relationships with 
supported candidates 
The strength of the relationships between candidates and the contributing firm. It is measured by the total 
length of relationships between the firm and the candidates. The data come from the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) summary files on political contributions to House and Senate elections. In the 
regressions, it is transformed by adding one and taking the natural log. 
Supported candidates’ ability The ability of the politicians to help the firm. It is measured by the home state of the firm and the 
candidate. The data come from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) summary files on political 
contributions to House and Senate elections. In the regressions, it is transformed by adding one and 
taking the natural log. 
Supported candidates’ power The power of the candidates. It is measured by the candidate’s committee ranking. The data come from 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) summary files on political contributions to House and Senate 
elections. In the regressions, it is transformed by adding one and taking the natural log. 
Corporate lobbying expenditures It is measured by aggregating all reported expenses. The lobbying information is collected from the 
OpenSecrets (http://www.opensecrets.org) of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).  
PSI The political strategy index that combines the yearly ranks of Number of politically connected board 
members, Number of supported candidates, and Lobbying expenditures. PSI
i
 
 
1
( )1 iK k ik
k=i k
Rank Political strategy
K N
, where Rankk(Political strategy
ik
) is the rank function which 
assigns rank for each observation, Political strategy
ik
 is the kth measure of political strategy measures for 
firm i in our sample, and K is the dimensions of measures. For each information variable, the firm with 
the highest value in the measure is ranked as N
k
 while the firm with the lowest value is ranked as one. The 
denominator (K
i
) averages the ranks regardless of the number of values of the firm in the sample. For 
example, the firm that has only two measures in records is divided by K
i
 = 2. Firm with all three measures 
is divided by K
i
 = 2. This construction scales the variable PSI to a value between 0 (weakest political 
strategy) and 1 (strongest political strategy). 
PSI-inclusive The inclusive political strategy index that combines the yearly ranks of all seven political strategy 
variables. 
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Variables Definitions 
Firm characteristics 
BHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal return over 12 months, computed as the difference between the buy-and-hold 
return of firm i from January to December of year y and the buy-and-hold return of the value-weighted 
market portfolio over the same period. 
BHAR (ew) Buy-and-hold abnormal return over 12 months, computed as the difference between the buy-and-hold 
return of firm i from January to December of year y and the buy-and-hold return of the equally-weighted 
market portfolio over the same period. 
BHAR (match) Buy-and-hold abnormal return, adjusted by a matching firm. In the beginning of each year, we classify 
the sample firms into sub-groups based on an 11-industry classification and into terciles of the previous 
year’s firm size, B/M, and one-year return. From each sub-group, we collect the median buy-and-hold 
return (BHR) over 12 months, from January to December of year y. Then, we compute BHAR (match) as 
the difference between each sample firm’s BHR and its matched BHR. 
Average monthly return The average of raw monthly returns in year y. 
Procurement amount The natural log of one plus the sum of all procurement contracts in the year (Goldman et al. (2010)). 
Information of procurement contracts is obtained from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next 
Generation (FPDS-NG) for period from 1990 to 2006.  
Litigation Litigation is a dummy that equals 1 if the lawsuit is filled a given calendar year y, and otherwise equals 0. 
The Stanford law school maintains the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse that has complied federal 
class actions related to a security fraud. We obtained litigation data from 
(http://securities.stanford.edu/fmi/xsl/SCACPUDB/recordlist.xsl). 
Settlement amount The amount of settlement. The value is set to 0 if the court dismiss lawsuit without imposing any cost on 
defendants. Data are from the Stanford law school’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. 
Size The natural log of one plus market value of common equity that is computed by the number of common 
shares times the share price at the end of calendar year. 
B/M The ratio of book equity to market equity for the firm. The market equity value of the firm is the value of 
all common stock classes outstanding. 
Beta It is computed using weekly returns in each year. 
Past return The stock return in year y-1. 
Industry dummies The 11-industry classification modified based on the Fama-French 10-industry classification. The first 
(consumer non-durables) industry includes food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, leather, and toys. The second 
(consumer durables) industry includes cars, TV’s, furniture, and household appliances. The third 
(manufacturing) industry includes machinery, trucks, planes, chemicals, and paper. The fourth (energy) 
industry includes oil, gas, and coal extraction and products. The fifth (high tech) industry includes 
computers, software, and electronic equipment. The sixth (telecommunication) industry includes 
telephone and television transmission. The seventh (shops) includes wholesale, retail, and some services 
such as laundries and repair shops. The eighth (health) industry includes healthcare, medical equipment, 
and drugs. The ninth (defense) industry includes guns, tanks, aircrafts, and ships for defense purpose. The 
tenth (construction) industry includes general and heavy constructions. The eleventh (other) industry 
includes mines, transportation, hotels, entertainment, and finance. 
 
  
 
 
